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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO 
DONALD EDWARD SCHOORL and SONIA ) 
LINN SCHOORL as Trustees of the ) 
DONALD AND SONIA SCHOORL TRUST ) 
u/t/ a March 2, 2015 ) 
) 




GUILD MORTGAGE COMP ANY, a California ) 
corporation; MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC ) 







TERRY 0. LANKFORD, an individual; ) 
FIRST AMERICAN TITLE COMP ANY, INC., ) 




Appeal from the Third Judicial District, Canyon County, Idaho. 
HONORABLE GEORGE A. SOUTHWORTH, Presiding 
Rebecca A. Rainey, FISHER RAINEY HUDSON 
950 W. Bannock Street, Suite 630 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Loren Ipsen & Joseph Pirtle, ELAM & BURKE, P.A. 
P. 0. Box 1539 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Attorney for Appellants 
Attorney for Respondents 
Date: 2/22/2016 
Time: 10:12 AM 
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Third Judicial District Court - Canyon County 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2015-0008639-C Current Judge: George A Southworth 












New Case Filed-Other Claims George A Southworth 
Filing: AA- All initial civil case filings in District Court of any type not listed in George A Southworth 
categories E, F and H(1) Paid by: Rainey, Rebecca (attorney for Donald 
And Sonia Schoorl Trust,) Receipt number: 0054431 Dated: 9/22/2015 
Amount: $221.00 (Check) For: Donald And Sonia Schoorl Trust, (plaintiff), 
Schoorl, Donald (plaintiff) and Schoorl, Sonia (plaintiff) 
Miscellaneous Payment: For Certifying The Same Additional Fee For George A Southworth 
Certificate And Seal Paid by: Fisher Rainey Hudson Receipt number: 
0054432 Dated: 9/22/2015 Amount: $4.00 (Check) 
Complaint Filed George A Southworth 
Summons Issued 4x George A Southworth 
Lis Pendens George A Southworth 
Affidavit Of Service - SERVED -Terry 9/26/15 (fax) 
Affidavit Of Service-Amy Mclaren (process agent)-9/25/2015 (fax) 
Affidavit Of Service -Guild Mortgage-9/24/2015 (fax) 
Affidavit Of Service -SERVED 9/28/15 First American Title Co. (fax) 
Application for Entry of Default 
George A Southworth 
George A Southworth 
George A Southworth 
George A Southworth 
George A Southworth 
Affidavit of Revecca A Rainey in Support of Application for Entry of Default George A Southworth 
Notice Of Appearance-Loren C. Ipsen & Joseph N. Pirtle for def -Guild George A Southworth 
Mortgage Co. 
Filing: 11 -Initial Appearance by persons other than the plaintiff or petitioner George A Southworth 
Paid by: Ipsen, Loren C (attorney for Guild Mortgage Company,) Receipt 
number: 0060743 Dated: 10/27/2015 Amount: $136.00 (Check) For: Guild 
Mortgage Company, (defendant) 
Order Granting Default Application for Entry of Default against Terry George A Southworth 
LAnkford, Mortgage Electronic Registration System, INC and First Alerican 
Title Company,INC 
Default Judgment against Terry Lankford 
Default Judgment Against First American Title Company INC 
Default Judgment Against Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems INC 
Civil Disposition Default Judgment entered for: First American Title 
Company, Defendant; Lankford, Terry, Defendant; Mortgage Electronic 
Registration Systems, Defendant; Donald And Sonia Schoorl Trust, 
Plaintiff; Schoorl, Donald, Plaintiff; Schoorl, Sonia, Plaintiff. Filing date: 
10/27/2015 
George A Southworth 
George A Southworth 
George A Southworth 
George A Southworth 
Filing: 11 -Initial Appearance by persons other than the plaintiff or petitioner George A Southworth 
Paid by: Ipsen, Loren C (attorney for Mortgage Electronic Registration 
Systems,) Receipt number: 0060826 Dated: 10/27/2015 Amount: $136.00 
(Check) For: Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, (defendant) 
Notice Of Appearance-Loren Ipsen for Mortgage Electronic Registration George A Southworth 
Systems 
Defendant Guild Mortgage Company's Motion to Dismiss George A Southworth 





Time: 10:12 AM 












Third Judicial District Court - Canyon County 
ROA Report 
User: WALDEMER 
Case: CV-2015-0008639-C Current Judge: George A Southworth 
Donald Schoorl, etal. vs. Terry Lankford, etal. 
Other Claims 
Notice Of Hearing on Defendant Guild Mortgage Company's Motion to 
Dismiss 
Notice of Joinder in Defendant Guild Mortgage Company's Motion to 
Dismiss 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion Hearing 11/24/2015 09:00 AM) Defendant 
Guild Mortgage Motn to Dismiss 
Judge 
George A Southworth 
George A Southworth 
George A Southworth 
Miscellaneous Payment: For Making Copy Of Any File Or Record By The George A Southworth 
Clerk, Per Page Paid by: Elum and Burke Receipt number: 0061051 
Dated: 10/28/2015 Amount: $16.00 (Credit card) 
Miscellaneous Payment: Technology Cost - CC Paid by: Elum and Burke George A Southworth 
Receipt number: 0061051 Dated: 10/28/2015 Amount: $3.00 (Credit card) 
Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems Inc's Motion to Set Aside Default George A Southworth 
and Default Judgment (fax 
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Set Aside (fax 
Defendant Guild Mortgage Company's Motion to Set Aside Default and 
Default Judgment Against Defendant Terry 0. Lankford 
George A Southworth 
George A Southworth 
Memorandum in Support of Defendant Guild Mortgage Company's Motion George A Southworth 
to Set Aside Default and Default Judgment Against Defendant Terry 0. 
Lankford 
Declaration of Shawna Ramos in Support of Guild Mortgage Company's George A Southworth 
Motion to Set Aside Default and Default Judgment Against Defendant Terry 
0. Lankford 
Notice Of Hearing of Defendant Guild Mortgage Companys Motion to Set George A Southworth 
Aside Default and Default Judgment Against Defendant Terry 0 Lankford 
and Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems lncs Motion to Set Aside 
Default and Default Judgment 11-24-15 (fax) 
Filing: 11 -Initial Appearance by persons other than the plaintiff or petitioner George A Southworth 
Paid by: DeAngeli, Phil E (attorney for First American Title Company,) 
Receipt number: 0063557 Dated: 11/9/2015 Amount: $136.00 (Check) 
For: First American Title Company, (defendant) 
Stipulation to Vacate Entry of Default and Default Judgment Against First George A Southworth 
American Title Company, Inc. (w/order) 
Disclaimer of Interest 
Order Vacating Entry of Default and Default Judgment Against First 
American Title Company INC 
George A Southworth 
George A Southworth 
Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Set Aside Default and to Dismiss George A Southworth 
(fax) 
Reply to Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to Motions to Set Aside George A Southworth 
Default and to Dismiss (fax) 
Hearing result for Motion Hearing scheduled on 11/24/2015 09:00 AM: George A Southworth 
Hearing Held UNDER ADVISEMENT Defendant Guild Mortgage Motn to 
Dismiss/def guild mortgage motn to set aside default and judgment 
3
Date: 2/22/2016 
Time: 10:12 AM 









Third Judicial District Court - Canyon County 
ROA Report 
User: WALDEMER 
Case: CV-2015-0008639-C Current Judge: George A Southworth 
Donald Schoorl, etal. vs. Terry Lankford, etal. 
Other Claims 
Hearing result for Motion Hearing scheduled on 11/24/2015 09:00 AM: 
District Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Patricia Terry 





George A Southworth 
George A Southworth 
George A Southworth 
Civil Disposition Judgment -Dismissed entered for: First American Title George A Southworth 
Company, Defendant; Guild Mortgage Company, Defendant; Lankford, 
Terry, Defendant; Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Defendant; 
Donald And Sonia Schoorl Trust, Plaintiff; Schoorl, Donald, Plaintiff; 
Schoorl, Sonia, Plaintiff. Filing date: 12/4/2015 
Case Status Changed: Closed George A Southworth 
Memorandum of Costs of Guild Mortgage Company and Mortgage 
Electronic Registration Systems, lnc.(fax) 
Motion for Reconsideration (fax) 
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Reconsider (fax) 
George A Southworth 
George A Southworth 
George A Southworth 
Response to Plaintiffs Motion to Reconsider (fax) George A Southworth 
Filing: L4 - Appeal, Civil appeal or cross-appeal to Supreme Court Paid George A Southworth 
by: Rainey, Rebecca (attorney for Donald And Sonia Schoorl Trust,) 
Receipt number: 0002485 Dated: 1/13/2016 Amount: $129.00 (Check) 
For: Donald And Sonia Schoorl Trust, (plaintiff) 
Bond Posted- (Receipt 2487 Dated 1/13/2016 for 100.00) Clerks Record George A Southworth 
Case Status Changed: Closed pending clerk action 
Appealed To The Supreme Court 
Notice of Appeal-Plaintiff 
Order Denying Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration 
George A Southworth 
George A Southworth 
George A Southworth 
George A Southworth 
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Rebecca A. Rainey, ISB #7525 
FISHER RAINEY HUDSON 
950 W. Bannock Street, Suite 630 
Boise, Id 83702 
rar@frhtriallawyers.com 
Phone (208) 345-7000 
Fax (208) 514-1900 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
F 1A.� .M. 
SEP 2 2 2015 
CANYON COUNTY CLERK �DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
DONALD EDWARD SCHOORL and SONIA 
LINN SCHOORL as Trustees ofthe 
DONALD AND SONIA SCHOORL TRUST 
ultla! March 2, 2015, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
TERRY 0. LANKFORD, an individual; 
GUILD MORTGAGE COMPANY, a 
California corporation; MORTGAGE 
ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION SYSTEMS, 
INC., a Delaware corporation; FIRST 
AMERICAN TITLE COMPANY, INC.,  a 
Florida Corporation, 
Defendants. 
COMPLAINT TO QUIET TITLE 
COMES NOW Donald Edward Schoorl and Sonia Linn Schoorl, trustees of the Donald 
and Sonia Schoorl Trust u/t/a/ March 2, 2015 ("Plaintiff' or the "Trust"), and for cause of action 
against defendants Terry 0. Lankford, Guild Mortgage Company, Mortgage Electronic 
Registration Systems, Inc., First American Title Insurance Company of Idaho, and any unknown 
COMPLAINT AND PETITION TO QUIET TITLE - 1 ORIGINAL 
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claimants to the real property situated in Canyon County, further described below, complains and 
alleges as follows: 
PARTIES, JURISDICTION, AND VENUE 
1. Plaintiff is a Trust that owns real property located in the state of Idaho. 
2. Terry 0. Lankford is an individual who may claim an interest in the real property 
located in the city ofNampa, Canyon County, Idaho, that is the subject of this dispute. 
3. Defendant Guild Mortgage Company is a corporation that may claim an interest 
in the real property located in the city of Nampa, Canyon County, Idaho, that is the subject of 
this dispute. 
4. Defendant Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. is a Delaware 
corporation that may claim an interest in the real property located in the city of Nampa, Canyon 
County, Idaho, that is the subject of this dispute. 
5. On information and belief, defendant First American Title Insurance Company of 
Idaho' s  successor in interest, First American Title Company, Inc., a Florida Corporation, may 
claim an interest in the real property located in the city ofNampa, Canyon County, Idaho, that is 
the subject of this dispute. 
6. The subject of this litigation is the real property located in Canyon County, Idaho, 
(the "Subject Property"), which is more particularly described as follows: 
A parcel of land being a portion of the NW 1/4 NW 1/4 of Section 
3 6, Township 2 North, Range 2 West, Boise Meridian, Canyon 
County Idaho, more particularly described as follows: 
Commencing at a found 3 inch diameter brass disk stamped "RMB 
878 1972" marking the NW comer of said NW 114 NW 1/4, 
(section comer common to sections 25, 2 6, 35 and 3 6), said comer 
bears S. 89° 50' 12" W., a distance of 5303.02 feet from a found 
5/8 inch diameter iron pin stamped "Brownell LS 89 60" marking 
the NE comer of said 3 6; 
COMPLAINT AND PETITION TO QUIET TITLE - 2 
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Thence along the northerly boundary of said NW 1 /4 NW 1 14, N. 
89° 50' 1 2" E., a distance of 979.68 feet, (formerly 979.75 feet), to 
a point marking the NW comer of that certain Quit Claim Deed 
recorded as Instrument Number 200307397 in the Office of the 
Recorder of Canyon County, Id.; 
Thence continuing along the northerly boundary of said NW 1 /4 
NW 1 14 and along the northerly boundary of said Quit Claim 
Deed, N. 89° 50'  1 2" E., a distance of 279.82 feet, (formerly 
279.75 feet), to a set PK nail marking the NE comer of said Quit 
Claim Deed, said point also being the POINT OF BEGINNING; 
Thence leaving the northerly boundary of said Quit Claim Deed 
and continuing along the northerly boundary of said NW 1 14 NW 
1 14, N. 89° 50' 1 2" E., a distance of 34.56 feet to a set PK nail; 
Thence leaving the northerly boundary of said NW 1 14 NW 1 /4, S .  
00° 1 7' 39" E . ,  a distance of 3 1 4.70 feet to a set 1 12 inch diameter 
iron pin stamped "CLS PLS 7732"; 
Thence parallel with the northerly boundary of said NW 1 14 NW 
1 14, S. 89° 50'  1 2" W., a distance of 36.56 feet to a set 1 /2 inch 
diameter iron pin stamped "CLS PLS 7732" marking the SW 
comer of  said Quit Claim Deed; 
Thence along the easterly boundary of said Quit Claim Deed, N. 
00° 04' 1 2" E., a distance of 3 1 4.70 feet to the POINT OF 
BEGINNING. 
("Subject Parcel"). 
7 .  This Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this action pursuant to Idaho 
Code § 1 -705 . 
8 .  Pursuant to Idaho Code § 5-5 1 4(a), (c), and (d), this Court has personal 
jurisdiction over Defendants in this action because Defendants are residents of and have 
transacted business within the State of Idaho; Defendants own, use, and/or possess real property 
within the State of Idaho; and Defendants have contracted to insure real property located within 
the State of Idaho. 
COMPLAINT AND PETITION TO QUIET TITLE - 3 
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I . 
9. Venue of this action properly lies in Canyon County, Idaho, pursuant to Idaho 




1 0. Plaintiff realleges paragraphs 1 -9 as if fully set forth herein. 
1 1 . By written agreement fully executed on November 1 1 , 200 1 ,  Dustin F. Pugh sold 
to the Trust' s  predecessor in interest, Gerret and Sharon Schoorl ("Schoorl"), all right, title, and 
interest in the aforementioned Subject Parcel. 
1 2. After purchasing the Subject Parcel, Schoorl protected the property by erecting a 
substantial enclosure, to wit, a fence, and thereafter treated the Subject Parcel in a manner 
consistent with their purchase of the Subject Parcel. 
1 3 .  Schoorl has remained in actual, peaceful possession o f  the Subject Parcel, to the 
exclusion of any and all other parties who may claim an interest in the Subject Parcel, since the 
2001 date of purchase - nearly fourteen ( 1 4) years. 
1 4. Schoorl has paid taxes on the Subject Parcel as required by law and/or met the lot 
number or other recognized exception to the tax requirement rule. 
1 5 .  Schoorl, by and through Quit Claim Deed executed on or about August 3 1 ,  201 5, 
quitclaimed to the Plaintiff all right, title, and interest in the Subject Parcel .  
CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
1 6. Plaintiff realleges paragraphs 1 - 1 5  as if fully set forth herein. 
1 7. Plaintiff is the rightful owner ofthe Subject Parcel. 
1 8 . Defendants have failed to state a claim for ownership interest in the subject 
property that would be adverse to the Plaintiff. 
COMPLAINT AND PETITION TO QUIET TITLE- 4 
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1 9. Plaintiff is entitled to an Order from this Court quieting title to the Subject Parcel 
in the name of the Plaintiff. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for relief as follows: 
1 .  With respect to the claim for relief, a judgment against Defendants, and all of 
them, quieting title to the Subject Property in the name of the Plaintiff; 
2.  For such other and further relief as this Court deems just, equitable, and proper. 
DATED this 22"d day of September 201 5. 
COMPLAINT AND PETITION TO QUIET TITLE- 5 
FISHER RAINEY HUDSON 
By: ��a 
Rebecca Rainey, of the 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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Ill 1 
I L e 0 A.M.--P.M. 
OCT 2 7 2015 
CANYON COUNTY cu;nK 
T. CRAWFORD, DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
DONALD EDWARD SCHOORL and SONIA 
LINN SCHOORL as Trustees ofthe Case No: CV 1 5-8639-C 
DONALD AND SONIA SCHOORL TRUST 
u/t/a/ March 2, 201 5, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
TERRY 0. LANKFORD, an individual; 
GUILD MORTGAGE COMPANY, a 
California corporation; MORTGAGE 
ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION SYSTEMS, 
INC., a Delaware corporation; FIRST 
AMERICAN TITLE COMPANY, INC., a 
Florida Corporation, 
Defendants. 
DEFAULT JUDGMENT AGAINST 
TERRY LANKFORD 
JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS: 
Plaintiff is hereby awarded judgment against Terry Lankford, title to the following 
described property is quieted in the name of Plaintiff, in fee simple absolute: 
A parcel of land being a portion of the NW 1 /4 NW 1 /4 of Section 
36, Township 2 North, Range 2 West, Boise Meridian, Canyon 
County Idaho, more particularly described as follows: 
Commencing at a found 3 inch diameter brass disk stamped "RMB 
878 1 972" marking the NW corner of said NW 1 /4 NW 1 /4, 
(section corner common to sections 25, 26, 35  and 36), said corner 
bears S .  89° 50' 1 2" W., a distance of 5303.02 feet from a found 
DEFAULT JUDGMENT AGAINST TERRY LANKFORD - 1 
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.. �· j 
5/8 inch diameter iron pin stamped "Brownell LS 8960" marking 
the NE comer of said 36; 
Thence along the northerly boundary of said NW 1 /4 NW 1 /4, N. 
89° 50' 1 2" E., a distance of 979.68 feet, (formerly 979.75 feet), to 
a point marking the NW comer of that certain Quit Claim Deed 
recorded as Instrument Number 200307397 in the Office of the 
Recorder of Canyon County, Id.; 
Thence continuing along the northerly boundary of said NW 1 /4 
NW 1 /4 and along the northerly boundary of said Quit Claim 
Deed, N. 89° 50' 1 2" E., a distance of 279.82 feet, (formerly 
279.75 feet), to a set PK nail marking the NE comer of said Quit 
Claim Deed, said point also being the POINT OF BEGINNING; 
Thence leaving the northerly boundary of said Quit Claim Deed 
and continuing along the northerly boundary of said NW 1 /4 NW 
1 /4, N. 89° 50' 1 2" E., a distance of 34.56 feet to a set PK nail; 
Thence leaving the northerly boundary of said NW 1 /4 NW 1 /4, S .  
00° 1 7' 39" E. ,  a distance of 3 1 4.70 feet to a set 1 /2 inch diameter 
iron pin stamped "CLS PLS 7732"; 
Thence parallel with the northerly boundary of said NW 1 /4 NW 
1 /4, S. 89° 50' 1 2" W., a distance of 36.56 feet to a set 1 /2 inch 
diameter iron pin stamped "CLS PLS 7732" marking the SW 
comer of said Quit Claim Deed; 
Thence along the easterly boundary of said Quit Claim Deed, N. 
00° 04' 1 2" E., a distance of 3 1 4.70 feet to the POINT OF 
BEGINNING. 
Dated thiJi... C day of October, 20 1 5 .  
DEFAULT JUDGMENT AGAINST TERRY LANKFORD- 2 
... ... . · 
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• I 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the d Uay of October, 20 1 5, I caused to be served a true 
and correct copy ofthe foregoing DEFAULT JUDGMENT AGAINST TERRY LANKFORD 
upon the following individuals in the manner indicated below: 
Terry 0. Lankford 
6757 Bennett Road 
Nampa, ID 83686 
Defendant 
Guild Mortgage Company 
921 S .  Orchard St., Suite G 
Boise, ID 83 705 
Defendant 
Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. 
1 209 Orange St. 
Wilmington, DE 1 9801 
Defendant 
First American Title Company 
1 95 S .  Broadway 
Blackfoot, ID 83221  
Defendant 
Rebecca A. Rainey 
Fisher Rainey Hudson 
950 W. Bannock St., Ste. 630 
Boise, ID 83 702 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
A'Via U.S. Mail 
( ) Via Facsimile 
( ) Via Overnight Mail 
( ) Via Hand Delivery 
/JYia U.S. Mail 
( ) Via Facsimile 
( ) Via Overnight Mail 
( ) Via Hand Delivery 
v1\ria U.S. Mail /( ) Via Facsimile 
( ) Via Overnight Mail 
( ) Via Hand Delivery 
/()via U.S. Mail 
( ) Via Facsimile 
( ) Via Overnight Mail 
( ) Via Hand Delivery 
�ia U.S. Mail 
( ) Via Facsimile 
( ) Via Overnight Mail 
( ) Via Hand Delivery 
Clerk of the Court 
DEFAULT JUDGMENT AGAINST TERRY LANKFORD- 3 
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L E D A.M .. ____ P.M. 
OCT 2 7 2015 
CI\NVON COUNTY CtJ:::RK 
T. CRAWFORD, DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
DONALD EDWARD SCHOORL and SONIA 
LINN SCHOORL as Trustees ofthe Case No: CV 1 5-8639-C 
DONALD AND SONIA SCHOORL TRUST 
u/t/a/ March 2, 20 1 5, 
DEFAULT JUDGMENT AGAINST FIRST 
Plaintiff, AMERICAN TITLE COMPANY, INC. 
vs. 
TERRY 0. LANKFORD, an individual; 
GUILD MORTGAGE COMPANY, a 
California corporation; MORTGAGE 
ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION SYSTEMS, 
INC., a Delaware corporation; FIRST 
AMERICAN TITLE COMPANY, INC., a 
Florida Corporation, 
Defendants. 
JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS: 
Plaintiff is hereby awarded judgment against First American Title Company, Inc., title to 
the following described property is quieted in the name of Plaintiff, in fee simple absolute: 
A parcel of land being a portion of the NW 1 14 NW 1 /4 of Section 
36, Township 2 North, Range 2 West, Boise Meridian, Canyon 
County Idaho, more particularly described as follows: 
Commencing at a found 3 inch diameter brass disk stamped "RMB 
878 1 972" marking the NW comer of said NW 1 /4 NW 1 /4, 
(section comer common to sections 25, 26, 35  and 36), said comer 
bears S .  89° 50' 1 2" W., a distance of 5303 .02 feet from a found 
DEFAULT JUDGMENT AGAINST FIRST AMERICAN TITLE COMPANY, INC. - 1 
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5/8 inch diameter iron pin stamped "Brownell LS 8960" marking 
the NE comer of said 36; 
Thence along the northerly boundary of said NW 1 14 NW 1 14, N. 
89° 50'  1 2" E., a distance of 979.68 feet, (formerly 979.75 feet), to 
a point marking the NW comer of that certain Quit Claim Deed 
recorded as Instrument Number 200307397 in the Office of the 
Recorder of Canyon County, Id.; 
Thence continuing along the northerly boundary of said NW 1 14 
NW 1 14 and along the northerly boundary of said Quit Claim 
Deed, N. 89° 50' 12" E., a distance of 279.82 feet, (formerly 
279.75 feet), to a set PK nail marking the NE comer of said Quit 
Claim Deed, said point also being the POINT OF BEGINNING; 
Thence leaving the northerly boundary of said Quit Claim Deed 
and continuing along the northerly boundary of said NW 1 /4 NW 
1 14, N. 89° 50' 1 2" E., a distance of 34.56 feet to a set PK nail; 
Thence leaving the northerly boundary of said NW 1 14 NW 1 14, S .  
00° 1 7' 39" E., a distance of 3 1 4.70 feet to a set 1 /2 inch diameter 
iron pin stamped "CLS PLS 7732"; 
Thence parallel with the northerly boundary of said NW 1 14 NW 
1 14, S. 89° 50' 1 2" W., a distance of 36.56 feet to a set 1 12 inch 
diameter iron pin stamped "CLS PLS 7732" marking the SW 
comer of said Quit Claim Deed; 
Thence along the easterly boundary of said Quit Claim Deed, N. 
00° 04' 12" E., a distance of 3 1 4.70 feet to the POINT OF 
BEGINNING. 
Dated thisd}_'day of October, 20 1 5 .  
DEFAULT JUDGMENT AGAINST FIRST AMERICAN TITLE COMPANY, INC.- 2 
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' . 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on th;J 'lday of October, 2015 ,  I caused to be served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing DEFAULT JUDGMENT AGAINST FIRST AMERICAN 
TITLE COMPANY, INC. upon the following individuals in the manner indicated below: 
Terry 0. Lankford 
6757 Bennett Road 
Nampa, ID 83686 
Defendant 
Guild Mortgage Company 
92 1 S .  Orchard St., Suite G 
Boise, ID 83 705 
Defendant 
Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. 
1 209 Orange St. 
Wilmington, DE 1 9801 
Defendant 
First American Title Company 
1 95 S .  Broadway 
Blackfoot, ID 8322 1 
Defendant 
Rebecca A. Rainey 
Fisher Rainey Hudson 
950 W. Bannock St., Ste. 630 
Boise, ID 83702 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
� U.S. Mail 
( ) Via Facsimile 
( ) Via Overnight Mail 
( ) Via Hand Delivery 
� U.S. Mail �C ) vi; Facsimile 
( ) Via Overnight Mail 
( ) Via Hand Delivery 
U'Via U.S. Mail /( ) Via Facsimile 
( ) Via Overnight Mail 
( ) Via Hand Delivery 
�ia U.S. Mail 
( ) Via Facsimile 
( ) Via Overnight Mail 
( ) Via Hand Delivery 
Avia U.S. Mail 
( ) Via Facsimile 
( ) Via Overnight Mail 
( ) Via Hand Delivery 
Clerk of the Court 
DEFAULT JUDGMENT AGAINST FIRST AMERICAN TITLE COMPANY, INC. - 3 
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.. 
L E D A.M. ___ P,.M. 
ocr 2 1 2015 
CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
T. CRAWFORD, DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
DONALD EDWARD SCHOORL and SONIA 
LINN SCHOORL as Trustees ofthe Case No: CV 1 5-8639-C 
DONALD AND SONIA SCHOORL TRUST 
u!t/a/ March 2, 20 1 5, 
DEFAULT JUDGMENT AGAINST 
Plaintiff, MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC 
vs. 
TERRY 0. LANKFORD, an individual; 
GUILD MORTGAGE COMPANY, a 
California corporation; MORTGAGE 
ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION SYSTEMS, 
INC.,  a Delaware corporation; FIRST 
AMERICAN TITLE COMPANY, INC., a 
Florida Corporation, 
Defendants. 
REGISTRATION SYSTEMS, INC. 
JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS: 
Plaintiff is hereby awarded judgment against Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, 
Inc., title to the following described property is quieted in the name of Plaintiff, in fee simple 
absolute: 
A parcel of land being a portion of the NW 1 14 NW 1 14 of Section 
36, Township 2 North, Range 2 West, Boise Meridian, Canyon 
County Idaho, more particularly described as follows: 
Commencing at a found 3 inch diameter brass disk stamped "RMB 
878 1 972" marking the NW comer of said NW 1 /4 NW 1 /4, 
DEFAULT JUDGMENT AGAINST MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION 
SYSTEMS, INC. - 1  
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(section comer common to sections 25, 26, 35  and 36), said comer 
bears S. 89° 50' 12" W., a distance of 5303 .02 feet from a found 
5/8 inch diameter iron pin stamped "Brownell LS 8960" marking 
the NE comer of said 36; 
Thence along the northerly boundary of said NW 1 /4 NW 1 /4, N. 
89° 50' 1 2" E., a distance of 979.68 feet, (formerly 979.75 feet), to 
a point marking the NW comer of that certain Quit Claim Deed 
recorded as Instrument Number 200307397 in the Office of the 
Recorder of Canyon County, Id.; 
Thence continuing along the northerly boundary of said NW 1 14 
NW 1 /4 and along the northerly boundary of said Quit Claim 
Deed, N. 89° 50' 1 2" E., a distance of 279.82 feet, (formerly 
279.75 feet), to a set PK nail marking the NE comer of said Quit 
Claim Deed, said point also being the POINT OF BEGINNING; 
Thence leaving the northerly boundary of said Quit Claim Deed 
and continuing along the northerly boundary of said NW 1 14 NW 
1 /4, N. 89° 50' 12" E., a distance of 34.56 feet to a set PK nail; 
Thence leaving the northerly boundary of said NW 1 /4 NW 1 /4, S .  
00° 1 7' 39" E . ,  a distance of 3 1 4.70 feet to a set 1 12 inch diameter 
iron pin stamped "CLS PLS 7732"; 
Thence parallel with the northerly boundary of said NW 1 14 NW 
1 /4, S .  89° 50' 1 2" W., a distance of 36.56 feet to a set 1 /2 inch 
diameter iron pin stamped "CLS PLS 7732" marking the SW 
comer of said Quit Claim Deed; 
Thence along the easterly boundary of said Quit Claim Deed, N. 
00° 04' 12" E., a distance of 3 1 4.70 feet to the POINT OF 
BEGINNING. 
Dated th� day of October, 201 5 . 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the d day of October, 20 1 5, I caused to be served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing DEFAULT JUDGMENT AGAINST MORTGAGE 
ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION SYSTEMS, INC. upon the following individuals in the 
manner indicated below: 
Terry 0. Lankford 
6757 Bennett Road 
Nampa, ID 83686 
Defendant 
Guild Mortgage Company 
92 1 S. Orchard St., Suite G 
Boise, ID 83705 
Defendant 
Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. 
1 209 Orange St. 
Wilmington, DE 1 9801  
Defendant 
First American Title Company 
1 95 S .  Broadway 
Blackfoot, ID 8322 1 
Defendant 
Rebecca A. Rainey 
Fisher Rainey Hudson 
950 W. Bannock St., Ste. 630 
Boise, ID 83702 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
pia U.S. Mail 
( ) Via Facsimile 
( ) Via Overnight Mail 
( ) Via Hand Delivery 
A"Yia U.S. Mail 
( ) Via Facsimile 
( ) Via Overnight Mail 
( ) Via Hand Delivery 
)'1Yia U.S. Mail 
( ) Via Facsimile 
( ) Via Overnight Mail 
( ) Via Hand Delivery 
�)Via U.S. Mail 
( ) Via Facsimile 
( ) Via Overnight Mail 
( ) Via Hand Delivery 
/().Via U.S. Mail 
( ) Via Facsimile 
( ) Via Overnight Mail 
( ) Via Hand Delivery 
Clerk of the Court 
DEFAULT JUDGMENT AGAINST MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION 




Loren C. Ipsen, ISB#1 767 
Joseph N. Pirtle, ISB #6973 
ELAM & BURKE, P.A. 
25 1 East Front Street Suite 300 
Post Office Box 1 539  
Boise, Idaho 83  70 1 
Telephone: (208) 343-5454 
Facsimile: (208) 384-5844 
lci@elamburke.com 
jnp@elamburke.com 
Attorneys for Defendant Guild Mortgage Company 
e 
F I A.� 4i>�.M. 
OCT 2 7 2015 
CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
C LAKE, DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
DONALD EDWARD SCHOORL and 
SONIA LINN SCHOORL as Trustees of the 
DONALD AND SONIA SCHOORL TRUST 
ultla! March 2, 201 5, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
TERRY 0. LANKFORD, an individual; 
GUILD MORTGAGE COMPANY, a 
California corporation; MORTGAGE 
ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION 
SYSTEMS, INC., a Delaware corporation; 
FIRST AMERICAN TITLE COMPANY, 
INC., a Florida corporation 
Defendant. 
Case No. CV- 1 5-8639-C 
DEFENDANT GUILD MORTGAGE 
COMPANY'S MOTION TO DISMISS 
COMES NOW Defendant Guild Mortgage Company ("Guild") by and through its 
attorneys of record, Elam & Burke, P.A., and hereby moves pursuant to Rule 1 2(b)(6) of the 
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure to dismiss the Plaintiffs' complaint for failure to occupy the 
disputed strip of land in question for the statutory period of 20 years. 
DEFENDANT GUILD MORTGAGE COMPANY'S MOTION TO DISMISS - 1 
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DATED this 2. 7�day of October, 201 5 .  
ELAM & BURKE, P.A. 
By: { )1 �It 
--��r-r---���������-
J os N. Pirtle, Of the firm 
At omeys for Defendant Guild Mortgage 
Company 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
d£ 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 0?7 -day of October, 201 5, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing document to be served as follows: 
Rebecca A. Rainey 
Fisher Rainey Hudson 
950 West Bannock Street, Suite 630 
Boise, ID 83 702 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
4848-4326-4810, V. I 
/ 
U.S. Mail 
�- Hand Delivery 
_ 
�eral Express 
�ia Facsimile - 5 1 4- 1 900 




Loren C.  Ipsen, ISB # 1 767 
Joseph N. Pirtle, ISB #6973 
ELAM & BURKE, P .A. 
25 1 East Front Street Suite 300 
Post Office Box 1 539 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 343-5454 
Facsimile: (208) 384-5844 
lci@elamburke.com 
jnp@elamburke.com 
Attorneys for Defendant Guild Mortgage Company 
F I A.�;i_s�M. 
OCT 2 7 2015 
CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
C LAKE, DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
DONALD EDWARD SCHOORL and 
SONIA LINN SCHOORL as Trustees of the 
DONALD AND SONIA SCHOORL TRUST 
u/t/a/ March 2, 201 5, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
TERRY 0. LANKFORD, an individual; 
GUILD MORTGAGE COMPANY, a 
California corporation; MORTGAGE 
ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION 
SYSTEMS, INC., a Delaware corporation; 
FIRST AMERICAN TITLE COMPANY, 
INC., a Florida corporation 
Defendant. 
Case No. CV- 1 5-8639-C 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
DEFENDANT GUILD MORTGAGE 
COMPANY'S MOTION TO 
DISMISS 
This is a case where Plaintiffs are attempting to snatch ownership to a strip of their 
neighbor's land by adverse possession. However, they have failed to occupy the disputed strip 
of land in question for the statutory period of 20 years; thus, they must lose. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT GUILD MORTGAGE COMPANY'S 
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The disputed strip of land is a narrow rectangular piece which is 34.56 feet wide and 
3 1 4.70 feet long, and described in Plaintiffs' Complaint as follows: 
A parcel of land being a portion of the NW 1 /4 NW 1 14 of Section 36, 
Township 2 North, Range 2 West, Boise Meridian, Canyon County Idaho, 
more particularly described as follows: 
Commencing at a found 3 inch diameter brass disk stamped "RMB 878 
1 972" marking the NW comer of said NW 1 14 NW 1 /4, (section comer 
common to sections 25, 26, 35  and 36), said comer bears S .  89° 50' 1 2" 
W., a distance of 5303 .02 feet from a found 5/8 inch diameter iron pin 
stamped "Brownell LS 8960" marking the NE comer of said 36; 
Thence along the northerly boundary of said NW 1 /4 NW 1 /4, N. 89° 50' 
1 2" E., a distance of 979.68 feet, (formerly 979.75 feet), to a point 
marking the NW comer of that certain Quit Claim Deed recorded as 
Instrument Number 200307397 in the Office of the Recorder of Canyon 
County, Id. ; 
Thence continuing along the northerly boundary of said NW 1 /4 NW 1 /4 
and along the northerly boundary of said Quit Claim Deed, N. 89° 50' 1 2" 
E., a distance of 279.82 feet, (formerly 279.75 feet), to a set PK nail 
marking the NE comer of said Quit Claim Deed, said point also being the 
POINT OF BEGINNING; 
Thence leaving the northerly boundary of said Quit Claim Deed and 
continuing along the northerly boundary of said NW 1 14 NW 1 14, N. 89° 
50' 1 2" E., a distance of 34.56 feet to a set PK nail ;  
Thence leaving the northerly boundary of said NW 1 14 NW 1 14, S .  00° 1 7' 
39" E., a distance of 3 1 4.70 feet to a set 1 /2 inch diameter iron pin 
stamped "CLS PLS 7732"; 
Thence parallel with the northerly boundary of said NW 1 /4 NW 1 14, S .  
89° 50 '  1 2" W. ,  a distance of  36.56 feet to a set 1 /2 inch diameter iron pin 
stamped "CLS PLS 7732" marking the SW comer of said Quit Claim 
Deed; 
Thence along the easterly boundary of said Quit Claim Deed, N. 00° 04' 
1 2" E., a distance of 3 1 4.70 feet to the POINT OF BEGINNING. 
(Complaint and Petition to Quiet Title, ,-r 6.) 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT GUILD MORTGAGE COMPANY' S  
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For illustrative purposes only, the strip in question is highlighted in yellow on the record 
of survey reproduced below: 
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For illustrative purposes only, Defendant Terry Lankford' s  property is highlighted on the 
drawing: 
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Plaintiffs' Complaint alleges that Defendants all may claim an interest in the property. 
(Complaint and Petition to Quiet Title, �� 2-5.) By way of background only, Defendant Guild 
Mortgage Company ("Guild") states that Mr. Lankford's  land is encumbered by a deed of trust 
securing a promissory note payable to the order of Guild in the original principal amount of 
$223 , 1 55 dated May 2 1 ,  201 0, and recorded May 27, 201 0, as Instrument No. 201 00243 87, 
records of Canyon County, Idaho, in which Defendant First American Title Company of Idaho 
("FATCO") is designated as trustee, and Defendant Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, 
Inc. ("MERS") is designated as beneficiary as nominee for Guild. Accordingly, Plaintiffs seek 
to seize title by adverse possession to the strip of land in question in derogation of the rights of 
Mr. Lankford and Guild. 
Standard of Review 
A court may grant a motion to dismiss under I.R.C.P. 1 2(b)(6) "when it appears beyond 
doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of [the] claim which would entitle [the 
plaintiff] to relief." Harper v. Harper, 1 22 Idaho 535,  536, 835 P.2d 1 346 (Ct.App. 1 992) 
(citation omitted). Every reasonable intendment will be made to sustain a complaint against a 
Rule 1 2(b)(6) motion. Ernst v. Hemenway and Moser Co., Inc., 1 20 Idaho 941 ,  946, 82 1 P.2d 
996, 1 00 1  ( 1 99 1 ). All facts alleged in the complaint are assumed to be true for the purpose of 
determining whether the complaint states a claim upon which relief can be granted. Williams v. 
Williams, 82 Idaho 45 1 ,  456, 3 54 P.2d 747 ( 1 960). Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 1 2(b)(6) is 
patterned after F.R.C.P. 12(b)(6); the federal courts have often reiterated that under F.R.C.P. 
1 2(b)(6), all factual allegations of the complaint are deemed to be true. 2A Moore's  Federal 
Practice � 1 2 1 .07[2.5] (2d ed. 1 994); Harrell v. Gaines, 2005 WL 567 1 583 at * 1  (E.D.Va.); 
McKee v. Arlington County (2004 WL 36871 67 at *1 (E.D.Va. 2004) ("The Court presumes all 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT GUILD MORTGAGE COMPANY'S 
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factual allegations in the complaint to be true and accords all reasonable inferences to the non-
moving party"); Tout v. Erie Community College, 923 F.Supp. 1 3  (W.D.N.Y. 1 995) ("The 
complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears "beyond doubt 
that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claims which would entitle him to 
relief'' (quoting Yusufv. Vassar College, 3 5  F.3d 709, 7 1 3  (2d Cir. 1 994), and Conley v. Gibson, 
355  U.S.  4 1 ,  45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 1 02, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 ( 1 957)). Further, a complaint should not be 
dismissed without granting leave to amend where a liberal reading of the complaint gives any 
indication that a valid complaint might be stated. Branum v. Clark, 927 F.2d 698, 705 (2d Cir. 
1 99 1 ). 
Under Rule 1 2(b)(6), all doubts should be resolved in favor of the complaint. Stewart v. 
Arrington, 92 Idaho 526, 530, 446 P.2d 895, 899 ( 1 968). "[I]f a bona fide complaint is filed that 
charges every element necessary to recovery, summary judgment is not justified." Id. at 533,  
446 P.2d at 900. On appeal of an order entered pursuant to Rule 1 2(b)(6), 
[T]he non-moving party is entitled to have all inferences from the record reviewed 
in its favor. After drawing all inferences in favor of the non-moving party's  
favor, [an appellate court] then asks whether a claim for relief has been stated. 
[The Court] does not consider whether the non-moving party will ultimately 
succeed in its claim, but whether it is "entitled to offer evidence to support the 
claim." 
Selkirk Seed Co. v. State Ins. Fund, 1 3 5  Idaho 640, 650-5 1 ,  22 P.3d 1 028, 1 037-38 (2001 )  
(citations omitted). 
Plaintiffs Have Failed to Occupy the Disputed Strip of Land for 20 Years 
Plaintiffs' Complaint is fatally flawed because they allege they have adversely possessed 
the disputed strip of land for approximately 1 4  years. (Complaint and Petition to Quiet Title, � 
1 3 .) This is 6 years short ofthe statutory period. Idaho Code § 5-203 provides: 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT GUILD MORTGAGE COMPANY'S 
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No action for the recovery of real property, or for the possession thereof, can be 
maintained, unless it appears that the plaintiff, his ancestor, predecessor or 
grantor, was seized or possessed of the property in question within twenty (20) 
years before the commencement of the action; and this section includes 
possessory rights to lands and mining claims. 
Prior to 2006, the prescriptive period under Idaho Code § 5-203 was only five years. 
Effective July 1 ,  2006, the Idaho Legislature amended § 5-203 to lengthen the prescriptive period 
from 5 to 20 years. Idaho Code § 67-5 1 0  provides that a new act takes effect on the later of July 
1 of the year of the regular session of the Legislature in which the act was passed, or sixty (60) 
days from the end of the session. Since the Idaho Legislature adjourned on April 1 1 ,  2006 (See 
2006 Idaho Session Laws), the amendment of § 5-203 was effective July 1 ,  2006. 
Plaintiffs' Complaint alleges that they purchased their property by agreement dated 
November 1 1 , 200 1 .  (Complaint and Petition to Quiet Title, ,-r 1 1 ), and after the date of purchase 
fenced off the disputed strip of land and began treating it as their own property (Complaint and 
Petition to Quiet Title, ,-r 12). By their own admission, therefore, Plaintiffs took possession of the 
disputed strip approximately 4 Y2 years before the amendment ofldaho Code § 5-203 . Had they 
continuously possessed the disputed strip for the five-year prescriptive period before July 1 ,  
2006, they might argue with some force that their title had matured. (See Idaho Code § 73- 1 1 5, 
providing that the repeal or abrogation of a statute does not affect "any right already existing or 
accrued." See also Casper Radio Operating Co. v. Lawrence, 1 53 Idaho 41 1 ,  420, 283 P.3d 728, 
737 (201 2) n. 2, addressing the amendment to Idaho Code § 5-203 and noting that "the twenty 
year time period does not apply to an easement by prescription acquired prior to the 
amendment." (emphasis added).) However, Plaintiffs could not obtain grandfather rights under 
the five-year version of Idaho Code § 5-203 because they had not possessed the strip for five 
years before the new prescriptive period of 20 years came into effect. Idaho Code § 73- 1 07 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT GUILD MORTGAGE COMPANY' S  
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provides that only the time that has begun to run before the date of a statutory enactment is 
counted for the purpose of determining an applicable period of limitation: 
When a limitation or period of time prescribed in any existing statute for 
acquiring a right, or barring a remedy, or for any other purpose, has begun to run 
before these compiled laws go into effect, and the same or any limitation is 
prescribed in these compiled laws, the time which has already run shall be 
deemed part of the time herein prescribed as such limitation. 
Even counting the time during which Plaintiffs allegedly possessed the disputed strip of 
land before July 1 ,  2006, they have failed to meet the 20-year prescriptive period. Plaintiffs' 
Complaint is fatally defective on its face and must be dismissed with prejudice pursuant to Rule 
1 2(b)(6). 
DATED this �7# day of October, 201 5.  
ELAM & BURKE, P.A. 
By: 
. Pirtle, Of the firm 
Attorneys for Defendant Guild Mortgage 
Company 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT GUILD MORTGAGE COMPANY'S 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 27� day of October, 201 5, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing document to be served as follows: 
Rebecca A. Rainey 
Fisher Rainey Hudson 
950 West Bannock Street, Suite 630 
Boise, ID 83 702 
Attorneys for Plaintif.ft 
4836-7887-5945, v. 3 
U.S. Mail 
__ Hand Delivery 
__ Federal Express __2\ria Facsimile- 5 1 4- 1 900 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT GUILD MORTGAGE COMPANY'S 




Loren C. Ipsen, ISB#1 767 
Joseph N. Pirtle, ISB #6973 
ELAM & BURKE, P.A. 
25 1 East Front Street Suite 300 
Post Office Box 1 539 
Boise, Idaho 83 701 
Telephone: (208) 343-5454 
Facsimile: (208) 384-5844 
lci@elamburke.com 
jnp@elamburke.com 
Attorneys for Defendant Guild Mortgage Company 
AND Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. 
F '_A.k� stl.M. 
OCT 2 7 2015 
CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
c LAKE, DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
DONALD EDWARD SCHOORL and 
SONIA LINN SCHOORL as Trustees ofthe 
DONALD AND SONIA SCHOORL TRUST 
u!t!al March 2, 201 5, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
TERRY 0. LANKFORD, an individual; 
GUILD MORTGAGE COMPANY, a 
California corporation; MORTGAGE 
ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION 
SYSTEMS, INC., a Delaware corporation; 
FIRST AMERICAN TITLE COMPANY, 
INC., a Florida corporation 
Defendant. 
Case No. CV- 1 5-8639-C 
NOTICE OF JOINDER IN 
DEFENDANT GUILD MORTGAGE 
COMPANY' S  MOTION TO 
DISMISS 
Defendant Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc.,  by and through its counsel of 
record, Elam & Burke, P .A., hereby gives notice of its joinder in Defendant Guild Mortgage 
Company's Motion to Dismiss. 
NOTICE OF JOINDER IN DEFENDANT GUILD MORTGAGE COMPANY' S  MOTION TO 
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DATED this .11 �day of October, 201 5 .  
ELAM & BURKE, P.A. 
By: 
__ L_���----�--------­
Jo p N. Pirtle, Ofthe firm 
Attorneys for Defendant Guild Mortgage 
Company 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the a7� day of October, 201 5, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing document to be served as follows: 
Rebecca A. Rainey 
Fisher Rainey Hudson 
U.S.  Mail 
950 West Bannock Street, Suite 630 
Boise, ID 83702 
Hand Delivery 
Federal Express � Via Facsimile- 5 1 4- 1 900 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
4831-6193-9498, V. I 
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1 0/30/201 5  1 1  :59 Elam & Burk. 
Loren C. Ipsen, ISB#1 767 
Joseph N. Pirtle� ISB #6973 
ELAM & BURKE, P.A. 
25 1 East Front Street Suite 300 
Post Office Box 1 539 
Boise, Idaho 83 701 
Telephone: (208) 343�5454 
Facsimile: (208) 384-5844 
lci@elamburke.com 
jnp@elamburke.com 
Attorneys for Defendants Guild Mortgage Company 
AND Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. 
·�:m4� I A.k {SOlt 
OCT 3 0 2015 
CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
K CANO, DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
DONALD EDWARD SCHOORL and 
SONIA LINN SCHOORL as Trustees of the 
DONALD AND SONIA SCHOORL TRUST 
u/tJa/ March 2, 2015,  
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
TERRY 0. LANKFORD, an individual;  
GUILD MORTGAGE COMPANY, a 
California corporation; MORTGAGE 
ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION 
SYSTEMS, INC., a Delaware corporation; 
FIRST AMERICAN TITLE COMPANY, 
INC., a Florida corporation 
Defendant. 
Case No. CV-1 5-8639-C 
MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC 
REGISTRATION SYSTEMS, IN'C.'S 
MOTION TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT 
AND DEFAULT JUDGMENT 
Defendant Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. ( .. MERS"), by and through its 
attorneys of record, Elam & Burke, P .A., moves this honorable Court, pursuant to Rule 60(b )( 4) 
of the Idaho Ru1es of Civil Procedure, for an order voiding the Default Judgment entered against 
MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION SYSTEMS, INC.'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE 
DEFAULT AND DEFAULT JUDGMENT - I 
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- ... 
MERS on October 27, 20 1 5, on the grounds and for the reasons that the Summons to MERS and 
Plaintiffs' application for the entry of default and default judgment are both defective, process on 
MERS was invalid, and MERS has a meritorious defense to Plaintiffs' cause of action as 
outlined in the pending Motion to Dismiss filed by co-defendant Guild Mortgage Company. 
This motion is made and based on the files and records in the above-entitled action, 
together with MERS's supporting memorandum, filed with this motion. 
DATED this .Jc2� day of October, 2015.  
ELAM & BURKE, P.A. 
By: ��������rm��a=�-
ts Guild Mortgage 
Company and Mo ge Electronic 
Registration Systems, Inc. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 3t2 � day of October, 201 5, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing document to be served as follows: 
Rebecca A. Rainey 
Fisher Rainey Hudson 
950 West Bannock Street, Suite 630 
Boise, ID 83 702 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
4812-3696-3882, v. I 
U.S. Mail 
__ Hand Delivery 
_ E9deral Express 
�ia Facsimile - S 1 4-1 900 
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1 0/30/201 5  1 1 :59 Elam & Burke-
Loren C. Ipsen, ISB#1767 
Joseph N. Pirtlet ISB #6973 
ELAM & BURKE, P .A. 
25 1 East Front Street Suite 300 
Post Office Box 1 539 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 343-5454 
Facsimile: (208) 384-5844 
lci@elamburke.com 
jnp@elamburke.com 
Attorneys for Defendants Guild Mortgage Company 
AND Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. 
�8+3845844 P.004/01 0  
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OCT 3 0 2015 
CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
K CANO, DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
DONALD EDWARD SCHOORL and 
SONIA LINN SCHOORL as Trustees ofthe 
DONALD AND SONIA SCHOORL TRUST 
ultlal March 2, 2015, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
TERRY 0. LANKFORD, an individual; 
GUILD MORTGAGE COMPANY. a 
California corporation; MORTGAGE 
ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION 
SYSTEMS, INC., a Delaware corporation; 
FIRST AMERJCAN TITLE COMPANY, 
INC., a Florida corporation 
Defendant. 
Case No. CV -1 5-8639�C 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
DEFENDANT MORTGAGE 
ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION 
SYSTEMS, INC.'S MOTION TO SET 
ASIDE DEFAULT AND DEFAULT 
JUDGMENT 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC 
REGISTRATION SYSTEMSt INC.'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT AND DEFAULT 
JUDGMENT - I  
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INTROp_ll.{;TION 
Defendant Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems. Inc. ("MERS"), by and through its 
attorneys of record, Elam & Burke, P.A., files this memorandum in support of its Motion to Set 
Aside Default and Default Judgment. The order of default and defaultjudgment. both entered on 
October 27, 20 1 5, should be set aside for the following reasons: 
1 .  The entry of default and default judgment should be declared void pursuant to 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b )( 4) because MERS, and the other Defendants, were served 
with defective summonses, making service ofprocess invalid; and 
2. MERS, and the other Defendants, have a meritorious defense to the action as set 
out in co-defendant Guild Mortgage Company's ("Guild'') Motion to Dismiss. 
MERS respectfully requests that this Court grant its Motion to Set Aside Default and 
Default Judgment, and restore the parties to their pre-default positions, so this matter may, in the 
interests of justice, be decided on the merits. 
PROCEDURAL FACTS 
On September 22, 201 5, Plaintiffs filed their Complaint to Quiet Title ("Complaint"). On 
that same day, four separate sununonses were issued for each respective Defendant. All 
summonses fail to comply with the mandatory provisions ofidaho Rule of Civil Procedure 4(b) 
and 4(b)(2) requiring the mailing address, physical address (if different) and phone number of 
the district court clerk. MERS was reportedly served with the Complaint and defective 
Summons on September 25, 20 1 5. 
On October 22, 201 5. Plaintiffs filed its Application for Entry of Default. seeking both an 
order of default and default judgment against MERS and co-defendants Terry Lankford and First 
American Title Company, Inc. ("First American Title''). The Application for Entry of Default 
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was supported by an affidavit of counsel. Neither the Application for Entry of Default nor the 
supporting affidavit contain a written certification of the address most likely to give the party 
notice of such requested default judgment as required by Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 5S(b )(2). 
On October 27, 201 5, this Court entered an Order Granting Application for Entry of 
Default Against Terry Lankford. Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems. Inc .• and First 
American Title Company. Inc. ("Order of Default"). This Court also entered separate Default 
Judgments against MERS. Mr. Lankford and First American Title. The Default Judgments were 
entered without a hearing to establish the truth of any averment by evidence. None of the 
Default Judgments are certified as final judgments pursuant to Rule 54(b). 
MERS filed its Notice of Appearance in this case on October 27, 201 5.  On that same 
day. co-defendant Guild Mortgage Company filed its Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs• Complaint 
pursuant to Ru1e 12(b)(6). Guild•s Motion to Dismiss is based on the fact that the allegations in 
Plaintiffs• Comp]aint establish that Plaintiffs have not adversely possessed the-disputed strip of 
property for the 20-year prescriptive period and are therefore not entitled to the requested relief. 
MERS filed its Notice of Joinder in Guild's Motion to Dismiss on October 27, 20 1 5. 
ANALYSI� 
Idaho courts have long disfavored default judgments. "Judgments by default are not 
favored, and the general rule in doubtful cases is to grant relief from the defau1t in order to reach 
a judgment on the merits." Johnson v. Pioneer Title Co. of Ada County, 1 04 Idaho 727, 732. 662 
P .2d 1 1 7 1 .  1 176 (Ct.App. 1 983) reh 'g denied, review denied (citations omitted). Consequently, 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 55( c) provides courts with authority to set aside orders of default 
and default judgments. It states that "for good cause shown the court may set aside an entry of 
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default and, if a judgment by default has been entered, may likewise set aside in accordance with 
Rule 60(b)." I.R.C.P. SS(c). 
I. 
THE ORDER OF DEFAULT AND DEFAULT JUDGMENT SHOULD BE 
SET ASIDE PURSUANT TO I.R.C.P. 60(b)(4) 
If a judgment is voidable, it will be set aside as a matter of law. See Blanc v. Laritz, 1 1 9 
Idaho 359, 361 ,  806 P.2d 452, 454 (Ct.App. 1 991). Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) states, 
in relevant part, that "[ o ]n motion and upon such tenns as are just, the court may relieve a party 
or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: 
. . .  (4) the judgment is void . . . . " I.R.C.P. 60(b)(4). Voidness of a judgment under Rule 60(b)(4) 
creates a nondiscretionary entitlement to relief. Knight Ins., Inc. v. Knight, 1 09 Idaho 56, 59, 704 
P.2d 960, 963 (Ct.App. 1 985). 
As stated previously, all Summonses issued in this case are defective. Idaho Rule of 
Civil Procedure 4(b) sets forth the requirements of swnmonses in civil cases, and provides that a 
swnmons shall include •• the mailing address. physical address (if different) and telephone 
number of the district court clerk . . . ... I.R.C.P. 4(b). Rule 4(b)(2) sets forth the form summons 
for civil cases other than eviction proceedings and requires that summonses shall be substantially 
in that fonn, which requires the •'mailing address, physical address (if different) and telephone 
number of the clerk . . . .  " I.R.C.P. 4(b)(2). Swnmons deficiencies can result in failure to meet the 
due process requirement of notice and effective service. See Herrera v. &tay, 146 Idaho 674, 
683, 201 P.3d 647, 656 (2009) (analyzing a summons under Rule 4(b)(2) for publication rather 
than the form set out in Rule 4(b)(3), and noting several deficiencies in the sununons, including 
failure to include the address and telephone number of the clerk of the co'Urt). 
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Here, Plaintiffs' Summonses were required to comply with Rules 4(b) and 4(b)(2). 
Plaintiffs' Swnmonses fail to do so because they do not state the mailing address. physical 
address or telephone number of the district court clerk. Plaintiffs' attempted process on MERS 
and the other defendants was therefore defective. 
Additionally, Plaintiffs ' Application for Entry of Default is defective. Idaho Rule of 
Civil Procedure 55(b)(2) provides, in relevant part, that "[a]ny application for a default judgment 
must contain written certification of the name of the party against whom the judgment is 
requested and the address most likely to give the party notice of such default judgment, and the 
clerk shall use such address in giving such party notice of judgment." I.R.C.P. 55(b)(2). 
Plaintiffs' Application for Entry of Default requests the entry of default judgments, but fails to 
include Rule 55(b)(2) mandated certification of the address most likely to give the party notice of 
such default judgment. Plaintiffs' Application for Entry of Default is therefore defective. 
Orders of default and default judgments entered based upon defective notice are improper 
and entitle a defaulted party to relief as a matter of law. See Knight Ins., Inc. v. Knight, 1 09 
Idaho 56, 60, 704 P.2d 960, 964 (1 985) (analyzing a default entered based upon a defective 
notice under Rule l l (b)(3)). The defects in Plaintiffs' Summonses and Plaintiffs' Application 
· for Entry of Default make the Order of Default and Default Judgment entered against MERS 
voidable. 
II. 
MERS HAS A MERITORIOUS DEFENSE TO THE PLAINTIFFS' COMPLAINT 
AS SET FORTH IN GUILD'S PENDING MOTION TO DISMISS 
When moving to set aside a default judgment, the moving party must not only meet the 
requirements of Rule 60(b ), but must also plead facts which, if established, would constitute a 
defense to the action. Cuevas v. Barraza, 146 Idaho 5 1 1 ,  5 1 6, 1 98 P .3d 740, 745 (Ct.App. 2008) 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC 
REGISTRATION SYSTEMS, INC.'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT AND DEFAULT 
JUDGMENT · 5  
38
1 0/30/201 5  12 :00 Elam & Burke- P.009/01 0  
(citation omitted). To establish a meritorious defense, a party moving to set aside a default 
judgment is not required to present evidence in order to have the default judgment set aside. I d., 
1 46 Idaho at 5 1 8. The meritorious defense requirement is a pleading requirement, not a burden 
of proof. !d. 
Plaintiffs• requested relief cannot be granted based upon the allegations in Plaintiffs' 
Complaint. Plaintiffs allege a quiet title action based upon adverse possession, but Plaintiffs· 
own allegations indicate that they have not adversely possessed the subject property for the 20-
year statutory period. MERS respectfully refers this Court to Guild's Motion to Dismiss and 
Supporting Memorandum and MERS's Notice of Joinder in that Motion. Since Plaintiffs are not 
entitled to the relief based upon the allegations in the Complaint and the operation of law, a 
judgment quieting title to Plaintiffs, even by default, should not have been entered. MERS has a 
meritorious defense to Plaintiffs' claimed relief. 
s;JONCLUSION 
The Order of Default and Default Judgment entered against MERS, as well as the other 
defendants, should be deemed void under Rule 60(b)(4). MERS has presented a meritorious 
defense to Plaintiffs' cause of action, and should be granted relief from Default Judgment. 
DATED this 3<:2� day of October, 2015.  
ELAM & BURKE. P.A. 
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CANYON COUNTY CLERK K� �DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
DONALD EDWARD SCHOORL and 
SONIA LINN SCHOORL as Trustees of the 
DONALD AND SONIA SCHOORL TRUST 
ultla! March 2, 20 15, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
TERRY 0. LANKFORD, an individual;  
GUILD MORTGAGE COMPANY, a 
California corporation; MORTGAGE 
ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION 
SYSTEMS, INC., a Delaware corporation; 
FIRST AMERICAN TITLE COMPANY, 
INC., a Florida corporation 
Defendant. 
Case No. CV- 1 5-8639-C 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
DEFENDANT GUILD MORTGAGE 
COMPANY'S MOTION TO SET 
ASIDE DEFAULT AND DEFAULT 
JUDGMENT AGAINST DEFENDANT 
TERRY 0. LANKFORD 
INTRODUCTION 
Defendant Guild Mortgage Company, by and through its attorneys of record, Elam & 
Burke, P.A., files this memorandum in support of the Motion to Set Aside Default and Default 
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Judgment against Defendant Terry 0. Lankford. The order of default and default judgment 
against Mr. Langford should be set aside for the following reasons: 
1 .  The entry of default and default judgment should set aside because Mr. Lankford 
was not personally served with the summons and complaint; rather, his ex-wife was served at a 
guest house owned by Mr. Lankford, but which does not constitute his dwelling house or usual 
place of abode. 
2 .  Mr. Lankford is an incompetent person against whom default judgment cannot be 
taken under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure unless he is represented by a general guardian or such 
other person who has entered an appearance in the action. 
3 .  The service of  process should be  declared void pursuant to Idaho Rule of  Civil 
Procedure 60(b)(4) because the form ofthe summons purportedly served on Mr. Lankford was 
defective, making service of process invalid; and 
4. Mr. Lankford has a meritorious defense to the action as set out in co-defendant 
Guild Mortgage Company's ("Guild") Motion to Dismiss. 
Guild respectfully requests that this Court grant the Motion to Set Aside Default and 
Default Judgment against Mr. Lankford, and restore the parties to their pre-default positions, so 
this matter may, in the interests of justice, be decided on the merits. Guild is an interested party 
and has standing to make this motion because the default judgment entered against Mr. Lankford 
purports to quiet title to the property in question in favor of the plaintiffs in fee simple absolute, 
thereby prejudicing Guild's rights as a secured creditor of Mr. Lankford. "A party in interest 
who is prejudiced by a default judgment may apply to have it set aside, even though he or she is 
not a party to the record. An application may be made only by a person who has an interest in 
the subject matter of the suit." 49 C.J.S .  Judgments § 596 (footnotes omitted). The Idaho 
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Supreme Court in Bannock Title Company v. Lindsey, 86 Idaho 583, 594, 388 P.2d 1 0 1 1 ,  1 0 1 8  
( 1 964) (citing 3 0  Am.Jur. , Judgments, § 880, PP. 79 1 -92, and 49 C.J.S . ,  Judgments, § 4 14, pp. 
8 1 8- 1 9), held that the validity of a default judgment is subject to attack by a person who is not a 
party to the action, but whose rights are affected by enforcement of the judgment: 
"The general rule is that the absence of jurisdiction of a court to render a 
particular judgment constitutes sufficient cause for a collateral attack upon the 
judgment whenever it is sought to be enforced, or in any suit in which its validity 
is drawn in question, whether the absence of jurisdiction is in regard to the subject 
matter, the parties, or, in proceedings in rem, the res." 
"A stranger to the record, who was not a party to the action in which the judgment 
was rendered or in privity with a party is not prohibited from impeaching the 
validity of the judgment in a collateral proceeding, but in order to do so he must 
show that he has rights, claims, or interests which would be prejudiced or 
injuriously affected by the enforcement of the judgment, and which accrued prior 
to its rendition." 
Since Mr. Lankford was never properly served, the Court acquired no personal 
jurisdiction over him. As a party interested in the res whose lien will be wiped out with respect 
to the disputed strip of land, Guild is entitled to seek an order setting aside the judgment against 
him and purporting to quiet title in fee simple absolute in favor of the plaintiffs. 
PROCEDURAL FACTS 
On September 22, 20 1 5, Plaintiffs filed their Complaint to Quiet Title ("Complaint"). On 
that same day, four separate summonses were issued for each respective Defendant. All 
summonses fail to comply with the mandatory provisions of Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 4(b) 
and 4(b )(2) requiring the mailing address, physical address (if different) and phone number of 
the district court clerk. Mr. Lankford was purportedly served with the Complaint and defective 
Summons on September 26, 20 1 5 .  
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On October 22, 20 15 ,  Plaintiffs filed their Application for Entry of Default, seeking both 
an order of default and default judgment against Defendant Terry 0. Lankford. The Application 
for Entry of Default was supported by an affidavit of counsel. Neither the Application for Entry 
of Default nor the supporting affidavit contain a written certification of the address most likely to 
give the party notice of such requested default judgment as required by Idaho Rule of Civil 
Procedure 55(b)(2). 
On October 27, 20 15 ,  this Court entered an Order Granting Application for Entry of 
Default against Terry Lankford ("Order of Default"). This Court also entered a separate Default 
Judgment against Mr. Lankford and First American Title. The Default Judgment was entered 
against Mr. Lankford without a hearing to establish the truth of any averment by evidence. 
MERS filed its Notice of Appearance in this case on October 27, 20 1 5 .  On that same 
day, co-defendant Guild Mortgage Company filed its Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Complaint 
pursuant to Rule 1 2(b)(6). Guild's Motion to Dismiss is based on the fact that the allegations in 
Plaintiffs ' Complaint establish that Plaintiffs have not adversely possessed the disputed strip of 
property for the 20-year prescriptive period and are therefore not entitled to the requested relief. 
MERS filed its Notice of Joinder in Guild's  Motion to Dismiss on October 27, 2015 .  
ANALYSIS 
Idaho courts have long disfavored default judgments. "Judgments by default are not 
favored, and the general rule in doubtful cases is to grant relief from the default in order to reach 
a judgment on the merits." Johnson v. Pioneer Title Co. of Ada County, 1 04 Idaho 727, 732, 662 
P.2d 1 1 7 1 ,  1 1 76 (Ct.App. 1983) reh 'g denied, review denied (citations omitted). Consequently, 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 55( c) provides courts with authority to set aside orders of default 
and default judgments. It states that "for good cause shown the court may set aside an entry of 
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default and, if a judgment by default has been entered, may likewise set aside in accordance with 
Rule 60(b)." I .R.C.P. 55(c). 
I. 
VALID SERVICE OF PROCESS WAS NOT MADE ON 
MR. LANKFORD PURSUANT TO I.R.C.P. 4(d)(2) 
Mr. Lankford was not served personally with the summons and complaint. On the date 
of the putative service of process, he was confined at Genesis Health Care - Meridian Center, 
1 3 5 1  W. Pine Avenue, Meridian, Idaho 83642-503 1 .  He had suffered debilitating strokes in 
November 20 14  and August 2015 .  Therefore, he was not present at his home at 6757 Bennett 
Road, Nampa, Idaho 83686 on September 26, 20 1 5, when service of process was ostensibly 
made. Instead of leaving the summons and complaint with an adult at Mr. Lankford's home, the 
process server went to a small guest house that is located behind Mr. Lankford's home and 
delivered the summons and complaint to his ex-wife, Dee Patrick. Ms. Patrick told no one about 
the lawsuit. 
Rule 4( d)(2) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure provides that substituted service may 
be made -
Upon an individual other than those specified in subdivision (3) of this 
rule, by delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint personally or by 
leaving copies thereof at the individual 's  dwelling house or usual place of abode 
with some person over the age of eighteen ( 1 8) years then residing therein or by 
delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to an agent authorized by 
appointment or by law to receive service of process. 
The guest house is not and was not Mr. Lankford's dwelling house or usual place of 
abode. It is not connected with his residence, and is an entirely separate structure. Although Mr. 
Lankford's adult daughter, Stacie, was staying at his residence, the process server did not leave 
the papers with Stacie but chose instead to drop them off with a person living in an entirely 
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separate residence. The ex-wife, for reasons of her own, kept the papers secret from Mr. 
Lankford or any other family members, thereby depriving him of the opportunity to defend 
himself against the Plaintiffs' land-grab. This does not constitute valid service. See Cox v. 
Quigley, 1 4 1  F.R.D. 222, 226 (D.Maine 1 992) (holding under F.R.C.P. 4(d) 1 that service of 
process upon the defendants' parents at their home in New York was insufficient where the 
defendant had graduated from college, left home and was serving on board a ship); Hysell v. 
Murray, 28 F.R.D 584, 587 (S.D. Iowa) (holding that where the defendant was in the army and 
living in on a military base in South Carolina, service of process on him at his father's house in 
Iowa was ineffective, even though defendant was in the process of purchasing a house in Iowa); 
James v. Russell F. Davis, Inc., 163 F.Supp. 253, 256 (N.D.Ind. 1958) (holding that service of 
process at the house of the defendant's  father was improper where the defendant was making a 
career in the Air Force and resided at his father's home only during short leave periods); Berner 
v. Farny, 1 1  F.R.D. 506, 508 (D.N.J. 1 95 1 ) (holding that where the defendant lived in New 
1 In instances in which an Idaho court rule is based upon the language of a federal rule, the 
interpretation of the federal rule is considered "most persuasive." See Terra- West, Inc. v Idaho 
Mut. Trust, LLC, 150  Idaho 393, 398, 247 P.3d 620, 625 (20 10) (citing Black v. Ameritel Inns, 
Inc. ,  3 1 9  Idaho 5 1 1 ,  5 14- 15 ,  8 1  P.3d 437, 4 1 6, 4 1 9-20 (2003)); Freiberger v. Amer. Triticale, 
Inc. , 120 Idaho 239, 242, 8 1 5  P.2d 437, 440 ( 1 99 1 )  (finding that where the Idaho rule is based on 
the federal rule the federal interpretation is persuasive); David Steed & Assocs., Inc. v. Young, 
1 1 5 Idaho 247, 249, 788 P.2d 7 1 7, 179 ( 1 988) ("Although we are not bound by the federal rule 
ofthe same nature, the federal court's  interpretation of the rule is persuasive."); Lawrence 
Warehouse Co. v. Rudio Lumber Co., 89 Idaho 389, 396, 405 P.2d 634, 64 1 ( 1965) ([T]he 
federal construction will be regarded as most persuasive."); Chacon v. Sperry Corp., I l l  Idaho 
270, 275, 723 P.2d 8 1 4, 8 1 9  ( 1 986) (noting that whenever possible, the Court should "interpret[ ] 
our rules of civil procedure in conformance with the interpretation placed upon the same rules by 
the federal courts."); Herrera v. Estay, 146 Idaho 674, 678, 20 1 P.3d 647, 65 1 (2009) 
(interpreting IRCP 12(b)(4) in light of decisions under FRCP 12(b)(4)); Martin v. Hoblit, 1 33 
Idaho 372, 376 n. 3, 986 P.2d 284, 288 n. 3 ( 1 999) (considering IRCP 4(a)(2)); Compton v. 
Compton, 1 0 1  Idaho 328, 334 n. 1 ,  6 12 P.2d 1 1 75, 1 1 8 1  n. 1 ( 1 980) (considering IRCP 60(b)); 
RCP 52(a)). 
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York, a house in New Jersey which he owned with his siblings and where he was registered to 
vote and filed his income tax returns was not his "dwelling house or usual place of abode" for 
purposes of service of process); Frasca v. Eubank, 24 F.R.D. 268, 269-70 (E.D.Pa. 1 959) 
(holding that where the defendant resided with his daughter in Massachusetts and only visited his 
son briefly in Pennsylvania, service of process on his son in Pennsylvania was insufficient); First 
Nat. Bank & Trust Co. of Tulsa v. Ingerton, 207 F.2d 793 , 795-96 (holding that where a race 
horse owner and his wife resided in a hotel in Raton, New Mexico, but rented a house in Denver 
for a short period of time during a race meet, service of process on a resident of the Denver rental 
house was ineffectual); Whetsell v Gosnell, 54 Del. 5 1 9, 520, 1 8 1  A.2d 9 1  ( 1 962) (holding that 
service of process on the defendant's  grandparents at their house in Wilmington, Delaware, 
where defendant has formerly resided was insufficient where defendant was a midshipman at the 
U.S. Naval Academy and intended to remain in military service, rather than return to Delaware). 
The cases involving divorced or divorcing spouses are particularly illustrative. For example, in 
Smithtown General Hospital v. Quinlivan, 88 Misc.2d 1 03 1 ,  389 N.Y.S.2d 776 ( 1 976), it was 
held that service was ineffective after defendant had been separated from and divorced from his 
spouse for over two years before service of process at her residence while he was stationed in 
Korea. Accord, American Bankers Ins. Co. v. Leist, 1 1 7 Ohio App. 20, 23, 1 89 N.E.2d 456, 458 
( 1 962) (holding that service left at the defendant's former home was not left at his usual place of 
abode where the defendant had separated from his wife, left his home, changed his residence and 
never returned); McFarlane v. Cornelius, 43 Or. 5 1 3 ,  523-24, 73 P 325, 328-29 ( 1903) (holding 
that a husband who had separated from his wife and moved out of the area did not have a 
dwelling house or usual place of abode at the family home). Service of process upon Mr. 
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Lankford's  former spouse at her residence did not constitute valid service on Mr. Lankford; 
although he owned the residence, it was not his dwelling house or usual place of abode. 
II. 
DEFAULT JUDGMENT CANNOT BE ENTERED 
AGAINST AN INCOMPETENT PERSON 
Rule 55(b)(2) provides in pertinent part that an incompetent person is exempt from 
default judgment: 
In all other cases the party entitled to a judgment by default shall apply to 
the court therefor, but no judgment by default shall be entered against an infant or 
incompetent person unless represented in the action by a general guardian, or 
other such representative who has appeared therein. 
The plaintiffs moved for default judgment against Mr. Lankford while he was confined to 
a care center after suffering two debilitating strokes, which left him cognitively impaired and 
unable to defend himself. According to his daughter's  affidavit, Mr. Lankford has trouble 
remembering details or comprehending abstract concepts. While his condition varies from day 
to day, his daughter considers him to be incompetent and unable of functioning on his own. He 
needs around-the-clock skilled nursing care, or at least health-aide assistance. No default 
judgment can be taken against him unless a general guardian or other person has appeared in the 
action in his behalf. 
III. 
THE ORDER OF DEFAULT AND DEFAULT JUDGMENT SHOULD BE 
SET ASIDE PURSUANT TO I.R.C.P. 60(b)(4) 
If a judgment is voidable, it will be set aside as a matter of law. See Blanc v. Laritz, 1 1 9 
Idaho 359, 36 1 ,  806 P.2d 452, 454 (Ct.App. 1 99 1 ). Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) states, 
in relevant part, that "[ o ]n motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party 
or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: 
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. . .  (4) the judgment is void . . . .  " I .R.C.P. 60(b)(4). Voidness of a judgment under Rule 60(b)(4) 
creates a nondiscretionary entitlement to relief. Knight Ins., Inc. v. Knight, 1 09 Idaho 56, 59, 704 
P.2d 960, 963 (Ct.App. 1985). 
The summons issued in this case with respect to Mr. Lankford is defective. Idaho Rule of 
Civil Procedure 4(b) sets forth the requirements of summonses in civil cases, and provides that a 
summons shall include "the mailing address, physical address (if different) and telephone 
number of the district court clerk . . . . " I.R.C.P. 4(b). Rule 4(b)(2) sets forth the form summons 
for civil cases other than eviction proceedings and requires that summonses shall be substantially 
in that form, which requires the "mailing address, physical address (if different) and telephone 
number of the clerk . . . .  " I.R.C.P. 4(b)(2). Summons deficiencies can result in failure to meet the 
due process requirement of notice and effective service. See Herrera v. Estay, 146 Idaho 674, 
683, 201 P.3d 647, 656 (2009) (analyzing a summons under Rule 4(b)(2) for publication rather 
than the form set out in Rule 4(b)(3), and noting several deficiencies in the summons, including 
failure to include the address and telephone number of the clerk of the court) . 
Here, Plaintiffs' Summonses were required to comply with Rules 4(b) and 4(b)(2). 
Plaintiffs ' Summonses fail to do so because they do not state the mailing address, physical 
address or telephone number of the district court clerk. Plaintiffs ' attempted process on Mr. 
Lankford and the other defendants was therefore defective. 
Additionally, Plaintiffs' Application for Entry of Default is defective. Idaho Rule of 
Civil Procedure 55(b)(2) provides, in relevant part, that "[a]ny application for a default judgment 
must contain written certification of the name of the party against whom the judgment is 
requested and the address most likely to give the party notice of such default judgment, and the 
clerk shall use such address in giving such party notice of judgment." I.R.C.P. 55(b)(2). 
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Plaintiffs ' Application for Entry ofDefault requests the entry of default judgments, but fails to 
include Rule 55(b)(2) mandated certification of the address most likely to give the party notice of 
such default judgment. Plaintiffs' Application for Entry of Default is therefore defective. 
Orders of default and default judgments entered based upon defective notice are improper 
and entitle a defaulted party to relief as a matter of law. See Knight Ins., Inc. v. Knight, 1 09 
Idaho 56, 60, 704 P.2d 960, 964 ( 1 985) (analyzing a default entered based upon a defective 
notice under Rule 1 1 (b)(3)). The defects in Plaintiffs' Summonses and Plaintiffs' Application 
for Entry of Default make the Order of Default and Default Judgment entered against MERS 
voidable. 
IV. 
MR. LANKFORD HAS A MERITORIOUS DEFENSE TO THE PLAINTIFFS' 
COMPLAINT AS SET FORTH IN GUILD'S PENDING MOTION TO DISMISS 
When moving to set aside a default judgment, the moving party must not only meet the 
requirements of Rule 60(b ), but must also plead facts which, if established, would constitute a 
defense to the action. Cuevas v. Barraza, 1 46 Idaho 5 1 1 , 5 1 6, 198 P.3d 740, 745 (Ct.App. 2008) 
(citation omitted). To establish a meritorious defense, a party moving to set aside a default 
judgment is not required to present evidence in order to have the default judgment set aside. !d., 
1 46 Idaho at 5 1 8 . The meritorious defense requirement is a pleading requirement, not a burden 
ofproof. !d. 
Plaintiffs' requested relief cannot be granted based upon the allegations in Plaintiffs' 
Complaint. Plaintiffs allege a quiet title action based upon adverse possession, but Plaintiffs ' 
own allegations indicate that they have not adversely possessed the subject property for the 20-
year statutory period. Reference is made to Guild's Motion to Dismiss and Supporting 
Memorandum and MERS's Notice of Joinder in that Motion. Since Plaintiffs are not entitled to 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT GUILD MORTGAGE COMPANY'S 
MOTION TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT AND DEFAULT JUDGMENT AGAINST 
DEFENDANT TERRY 0. LANKFORD - 1 0  
50
the relief based upon the allegations in the Complaint and the operation of law, a judgment 
quieting title to Plaintiffs, even by default, should not have been entered. Mr. Lankford has a 
meritorious defense to Plaintiffs' claimed relief. 
CONCLUSION 
The Order of Default and Default Judgment entered against Terry 0. Lankford as well as 
the other defendants, should be deemed void under Rule 60(b)(4). A meritorious defense to 
Plaintiffs' cause of action has been presented, and Mr. Lankford should be granted relief from 
Default Judgment. 
DATED this 3 '!I day ofNovember, 20 1 5 .  
ELAM & BURKE, P.A. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the $ Y day ofNovember, 20 15 ,  I caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing document to be served as follows: 
Rebecca A. Rainey 
Fisher Rainey Hudson 
950 West Bannock Street, Suite 630 
Boise, ID 83702 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
4820-7709-7258, v. I 
U.S. Mail 
__ Hand Delivery 
__ Federal Express 
_£via Facsimile - 5 14- 1 900 
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Loren C. Ipsen, ISB#1 767 
Joseph N. Pirtle, ISB #6973 
ELAM & BURKE, P.A. 
25 1 East Front Street Suite 300 
Post Office Box 1 539  
Boise, Idaho 83  70 1 
Telephone: (208) 343-5454 
Facsimile: (208) 384-5844 
lci@elamburke.com 
jnp@elamburke.com 
_ F l . L E o --A.fvl.�:�PIVJ. 
r:::':f 0 3 2015 �'YON COUNTY CLERK 
JK.. f "' C DEPUTY Po., � 
Attorneys for Defendant Guild Mortgage Company 
AND Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
DONALD EDWARD SCHOORL and 
SONIA LINN SCHOORL as Trustees of the 
DONALD AND SONIA SCHOORL TRUST 
ultlal March 2, 20 1 5, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
TERRY 0. LANKFORD, an individual; 
GUILD MORTGAGE COMPANY, a 
California corporation; MORTGAGE 
ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION 
SYSTEMS, INC. ,  a Delaware corporation; 
FIRST AMERICAN TITLE COMPANY, 
INC.,  a Florida corporation 
Defendant. 
Shawna Ramos declares as follows: 
Case No. CV-1 5-8639-C 
DECLARATION OF SHA WNA RAMOS 
IN SUPPORT OF GUILD MORTGAGE 
COMPANY' S  MOTION TO SET ASIDE 
DEFAULT AND DEFAULT 
JUDGMENT AGAINST DEFENDANT 
TERRY 0. LANKFORD 
1 .  I am a daughter of Defendant Terry 0. Lankford. I am over the age of 1 8  years 
and have knowledge of this matter. 
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• 
2. In November 20 14 my father, Terry 0. Lankford, had a stroke. He had another 
debilitating stroke for which he was hospitalized on August 1 9, 20 1 5 .  
3 .  After his hospitalization, my father was �ransported on August 25, 20 15, to 
Genesis Heath Care in Meridian, Idaho for further treatment. 
4. My father's cognitive functioning and memory for details have been impaired, 
although at some times his memory is better than at other times. In my opinion, my father is not 
competent to handle his affairs 
5 .  My father has not been living in  his residence located at 6757 Bennett Road, 
Nampa, Idaho, since the time of his stroke. My adult sister, Stacie Lankford, lives in the main 
house, a photograph of which is attached hereto as Exhibit A. My mother, and my father's ex-
wife, Dee Patrick, lives in a guest house on the property. Attached hereto as Exhibit B is a 
photograph of that home. These are separate residences and are not connected. 
6. My father was not served with a copy of the Summons and Complaint at issue in 
this matter. 
7. I only discovered on a later date that Dee Patrick, my father's ex-wife, had been 
served with the Summons and Complaint and had placed the documents on a table with other 
miscellaneous papers. Dee Patrick did not inform anyone that she had been served with the 
Summons and Complaint. 
I DECLARE UNDER PENALTY OF PERJURY UNDER THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF 
IDAHO THAT THE FOREGOING IS TRUE AND CORRECT. 
\\-?:,-\5 \f..u()o.... �:nv 
Date and City and State Signed SHA WNA RAMOS 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 3 day ofNovember, 2015 ,  I caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing document to be served as follows: 
Rebecca A. Rainey 
Fisher Rainey Hudson 
950 West Bannock Street, Suite 630 
Boise, ID 83702 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
4837-8005-0218, v. I 
U.S. Mail 
__ Hand Delivery 
E€deral Express 
7Via Facsimile - 5 14- 1 900 
DECLARATION OF SHA WNA RAMOS IN SUPPORT OF GUILD MORTGAGE 
COMPANY' S MOTION TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT AND DEFAULT JUDGMENT 
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Rebecca A. Rainey, JSB #7525 
FrsHER RAJNEYHuosoN 
950 W. Bannock Street, Suite 630 
Boise, ID 83702 
rar@frhtrialla"\vyers.com 
Phone (208) 345-7000 
Fax (208) 5 1 4- 1 900 
Attorney for Plaintiff .. � ... 
NOV 1 7 2015 
CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
M MAfltTINEZ, DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
DONALD EDWARD SCHOORL and SONIA 
LINN SCHOORL as Trustees of the Case No: 1 5�8639-C 
DONALD AND SONIA SCHOORL TRUST 
u/t/a/ March 2, 201 5, MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO 
MOTIONS TO SET ASIDE DEF AliLT 
vs. 
Plaintiff: Al'.1l TO DISMISS 
TERRY 0. LANKFORD, an individual; 
GUILD MORTGAGE COMPANY. a 
California corporation; MORTGAGE 
ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION SYSTEMS, 
INC.,. a Delaware corporation; FIRST 
AMERICAN TITLE COMPANY, INC., a 
Florida Corporation, 
Defendants. 
COME NOW Donald Edward Schoorl and Sonia Linn Schoorl , trustees of the Donald 
and Sonia Schoorl Trust ult/al March 2, 20 1 5  (''Plaintitr' or the ''Trust") and hereby ti le the 
following memorandum in opposition to the motions filed by defendant Guild Mortgage 
Company ('"Guild") to set aside defaults entered against defendants Mortgage Electronic 
Registration Systems, I nc. and Terry 0. Lankford as well as Guild's mt)tion to dismiss. 
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INTRODUCTION 
All motions filed by Guild focus on one centtal legal issue: the applicable limitations 
period for adverse possession \Vhen the adverse possession period commenced in November of 
200 1 .  Because the limitations period then in etTect required that a parcel be adversely possessed 
i:()r only five years. rather than the 20 year limitations period imposed by a subsequent 
ame11dment of the statute, the five year possession per-iod controls for pmposes of this action. 
RELEVANT FACTS 
1 .  Plaintiff s  predecessor in interest purchased and began occupying the disputed 
parcel ofprope11y in November of 2001 . 
2. At the time plaintiffs predecessor in interest purchased and began occupying the 
property, Idaho Code Section 5-203 contained a five year l lmitations period. 
3. E±fective July 1 ,  2006-only four months shy of the five year limitations period 
that was in place at the time plainliff's predecessor in interest purchased and began occupying 
the property�the amendment to Idaho Code Section 5�203 went into e1Tcct, changing the 
applicable limitations period from 5 years to 20. 
4. Plaintiff and its prede<:essor in interest have been occupying the disputed parcel 
continuously since November of 200 1 .  
ARGUMENT 
This Court should reject dctendant Guild's  request to give Idaho Code Section 5-203 a 
retroactive effect. Under well set led Idaho law, "no statute is retroactive . 'unless exp:tessiy so 
declared."' Lincoln County v. Fidelity and Deposit Co. r?fMaryland, 1 02 Idaho 489, 49L 632 
P.2d 678, 68 1 ( 1 98 1) (quoting I. C. § 7J- 10 1  ). While Idaho Courts do make a distinction 
bet\vcen the retroactive effect of statutes that impact substantive rights� rather than simply 
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procedural or remedial statutes, the period of adversely possessing a tract of land is properly 
characterized as impacting substantive rights. Statutes are said to impact substantive rights '.vhen 
they "create, enlarge, diminish or destroy contractual or vested rights." lvfeyers v. Vermaas, 1 1 4 
Idaho 85, 87, 753 P.2d 296, 298 (1 988) (holding that amendment of a statute so that the statute 
mandated an award of attomey's fees ''enlarged the scope of entitlement to mandatory attorney 
fcc awards'' and, as such, was properly characterized substantive rather than procedural or 
remedial). 
\\"hile Idaho's courts of appellate review have not yet had the opportunity to pass upon 
the limitations period applicable to adverse possession periods, the Supreme Court of South 
Carolina resolved the issue. In LJ·les v. RluJch, 30 S.C. 291 ,  9 S.E. 334 ( 1 889) the court refused 
to give a retroactive ef1ect to a statutory amendment changing the applicable limitations period 
tor adverse possession. In Lyles, the applicable limitations period was shortened (from 20 years 
to 1 0) rather than enlarged (from 5 years to 20) as in the present case. The Lyles Court noted that 
a cause of action for adverse possession accrued on the date the party claiming the adverse 
possession commenced such adverse possession. And. because the adverse possession 
commenced when the l imitations period was 20 years, the Lyles Court held that the 20 year 
possession period applied. In the present case. the change in  the relevant statute enlarged the 
applicable limitations period, rather than reduced it. Hmvever, because statutes are said to 
impact substantive rights when they "create, enlargCl, diminish or destroy contractual or vested 
rights" (See ,,·\!/eyers, 1 1 4 Idaho at 87) (emphasis added), the reasoning used and results reached 
by the Lyles Court are instructive. Accordingly, this Court should hold that the accrual date for 
plaintiffs ' claim for adverse possession is the date on which the adverse possession 
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commenced-November of 200 l �and that the five year l imitations period of § 5-203 then in 
effect is the controll ing limitations period. 
CONCLUSION 
On behalf of itsel f  and other defendants, Guild raises only the issue of the applicable 
period of I imitations to support its motion to dismiss and to set aside defaults. As the foregoing 
shows, the amendment to the applicable limitations period impacts substantive rights ofplaintiff 
regarding its claim tor adverse possession and, as such. cannot and should not, be applied 
retroactively. For these reasons, plaintiff respectfully requests that this Court deny the 
outstanding motion to dismiss and motions to set aside default. 
DATED this 1 7111 day ofNovember 201 5 .  
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
'1ft . .-
l HEREBY CERTIFY that on the ILday of November, 201 5, I caused to be served a 
tn1e and conect copy of the foregoing MEMORANDUM IN OI)POSITION TO MOTIONS 
TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT AND TO DISMISS upon the tbLIO\ving individuals in the manner 
indicated below: 
Terry 0. Lankt't1rd 
6757 Bennett Road 




Elam & Burke, P.A. 
25 1 E. Front St.. Ste. 3 00 
P,O_ Box 1 539 
Boise. ID 83 70 1 - 1 539 
Auomeys for Defendants Guild Mcwtgage 
Compan_v and Afortgage Electronic RegiStration 
,s:vstcms, Inc. 
Phillip Deangeli 
355 \V. Myrtle Street, Ste., 1 0 1  
P.O. Box 6846 
Boise, ID 83707-6846 
Allorne:vsfor First American Title Company. inc. 
'bl)Via U.S. Mail ( ) Via Facsimile 
( ) Via Overnight Mail  
( ) Via Hand Delivery 
( ) Via U.S. Mail )<) Via facsimile 
( ) Via Overnight Mail 
( ) Via Hand Delivery 
( ) Via U.S. Mail V4 Via Facsimile ( ) Via Overnight Mail ( ) Via Ha11.d DeliYery 
jtc.:::c .... ,�;.P�������···� 
Rebecca A. Rainey .,;.,ef.the-effrrn 
Atlorne.vfi)r Plaint({/' 
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Boise, Idaho 83 701 
Telephone: (208) 343-5454 
Facsimile: (208) 3 84-5844 
lci@elamburke.com 
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NOV 2 0 2015 
CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
M MA.fi'TlNEZ. DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR .THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
DONALD EDWARD SCHOORL and 
SONIA LINN SCHOORL as Trustees of the 
DONALD AND SONIA SCHOORL TRUST 
ult/a/ March 2, 2015, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
TERRY 0. LANKFORD, an individual; 
GUILD MORTGAGE COMPANY, a 
California corporation; MORTGAGE 
ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION 
SYSTEMS, INC., a Delaware corporation; 
FIRST AMERICAN TITLE COMPANY, 
INC., a Florida corporation 
Defendant 
Case No . CV-1 5-8639-C 
REPLY TO PLAINTIFFS'  
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION 
. TO MOTIONS TO SET ASIDE 
DEFAULT AND TO DISMISS 
Come now defendants Guild Mortgage Company (nGuild") and Mortgage Electronic 
Registration Systems, Inc. ("MERS''), by and through their attorneys of record, Elam & Burke, 
P.A., and reply to plaintiff's memorandum in opposition to motions to set aside default and 
dismiss. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In this case, the plaintiffs seek to obtain ownership of a strip of land approximately 35 
feet in width owned by defendant Terry Lankford. Guild Mortgage Company ("Guild'') is  Mr. 
Lankford's lender and possesses a deed of trust encumbering his property. MERS was named as 
nominee for Guild under the deed of trust, but possesses no economic interest in the action. The 
issue is whether the plaintiffs, in order to prevail, must adversely occupy the property for 20 
years, as required by the present statute, 1 or whether a period of adverse possession of only 5 
years, as previously required by the statute in effect when they first encroached on Mr. 
Lankford's land,2 is sufficient. It should be noted that the plaintiffs had not perfected their 
alleged right on the date the statute was amended;3 therefore, they had no vested right to 
ownership on the date of amendment. 
For purposes of the present motion, it will be assumed that all facts alleged in the 
complaint (as opposed to legal conclusions) are true. I.R.C.P. i2(b)(6); Williams v. Williams, 82 
Idaho 45 1 , 456, 354 P.2d 747 (1960). Even given this asswnption, the complaint fails on its face 
to state a cause of action. Guild has also moved to set aside the defaults taken by the plaintiffs 
against Mr. Lankford, whom Guild believes to be lygally incompetent, and against MERS. 
Apparently, the only opposition put forward by the plaintiffs to the motion to set aside the 
1 Idaho Code § 5-203, prior to its amendment in 2006, provided that the statutory period for 
adverse possession was five years. 
2 Idaho Code § 5-203 was amended effective July 1 ,  2006, to provide that the statutory period is 
now 20 years. 
3 According to their complaint, as of July 1 , 2006, the plaintiffs had occupied the disputed strip 
for only four years and eight months. As of the date they filed their complaint, their period of 
occupation was approximately 1 4  Y2. years. 
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defaults is based on whether these defendants possess a colorable defense; the plaintiffs have not 
articulated any other reason for opposing the motion to set aside defaults. 
Plaintiffs l!!ve Failed to Occupy the Disput�_Strip of Land fo.- 20 Years 
Plaintiffs' Complaint is fatally flawed because they allege they have adversely possessed 
the disputed strip of land for approximately 1 4  years. (Complaint and Petition to Quiet Title, � 
1 3 .) This is six years short of the statutory period. Prior to 2006, the prescriptive period under 
Idaho Code §  5-203 was only five years. Effective July 1 ,  2006, the Idaho Legislature amended 
§ 5-203 to lengthen the prescriptive period from 5 to 20 years. 
By their own admission, Plaintiffs encroached on the disputed strip approximately 4 � 
years before the amendment of Idaho Code § 5-203. Capstar Radio Operating Co. v. Lawrence, 
1 53 Idaho 4 1 1 ,  420, 283 P.3d 728, 737 (2012) n. 2, noted that "the twenty year time period does 
not apply to an easement by prescription acquired prior to the amendment., (emphasis added). 
However, Plaintiffs did not obtain grandfather rights under the five-year version of Idaho Code § 
5-203 because they had not possessed the strip for five years before the new prescriptive period 
of 20 years came into effect. Even counting the time during which Plaintiffs allegedly possessed 
the disputed strip of land before July 1 ,  2006, they have failed to meet the 20-year prescriptive 
period. 
Plaintiffs' Reli,!lnce on an Antiquated South Carolina Case Is Misulaced 
In support of their argument that the 5-year limitation period should be applied, plaintiffs 
cite only a South Carolina case that is over 125 years old. Lyles v, Roach, 30 S.Car. 29 1 ,  9 S.E. 
334 (1 889). However, that case is distinguishable on its facts, is no longer good law even in 
South Carolina, and certainly is not applicable to Idaho. In the South Carolina Roach case, the 
facts were just the converse of the present case, In Roach, the parties claiming adverse 
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possession alleged they took possession of the land in question in 1 872. At that time the 
statutory period for adverse possession under South Carolina law was 20 years. In 1 873, the 
South Carolina General Assembly changed the statutory period to 1 0 years. Suit was filed in 
1 8 84, Thus, the case involved a situation where the statute of limitation was shortened, not 
lengthened. The Roach court held that, assuming the claimants took possession while the old 
law was still in effect. the longer statutory period in effect prior to 1 873 applied, thus barring the 
claim for adverse possession. 
The holding of Roach was later distinguished or flatly repudiated by the federal courts, 
applying South Carolina law. For example, in Cannon v. Johnson, Lane, Space, Smith & 
Company, Inc., 460 F.Supp. 724 (D.S.C. 1 978), the defendants were sued for alleged violations 
of the South Carolina blue-sky laws. At the time the alleged securities violations took place, the 
applicable period of limitation was two years. After the date of commission of the allegedly 
wrongful acts but before suit was filed, this statute was amended to extend the limitation period 
to three years. 4 The defendants contended that the proper limitation period is that which was in 
effect when the cause of action arose; i.e., two years, and that the two-year statute of limitation 
was a bar to recovery. Id. at 725. Holding that the defendants had no vested right in the shorter 
limitation period, the Court rejected the defendants' contention: 
Strictly speaking, a statute of limitations when applicable is not a defense to an 
action, but when pleaded, which it must be in order for a defendant to benefit 
therefrom, is a bar to the action . A limitations statue is a statute of grace. 
permitting the avoidance and evasion of the liability; and while given recognition 
when pleaded, it has never been favored by the courts. · If there is any doubt as to 
which of two statutes applies, that doubt must be resolved in favor of the longest 
period, according to the great weight of authority. 
4 Note that this fact pattern is consonant with that of the present case. The 5-year version of 
Idaho Code § 5-203 was in effect at the time the plaintiffs first encroached on their neighbor's 
land, but the statute was amended before the complaint was filed. 
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!d. at 728 (citation omitted). 
The Cannon Court noted that. whether statutes of limitation are deemed to be applied 
prospectively of retroactively. the federal courts generally adhere to the rule than an amendment 
lengthening a statute of limitations may properly be applied to causes of action which are viable 
at the time of the effective date of the amendment. ld "This rule does not stand for the 
proposition that a cause of action can be revived by a statute passed after the limitation period 
has expired.5 It merely stands for the proposition that amendments extending statutes of 
limitations apply to pre-existing claims not already barred at the time the amended statute of 
limitations was passed., !d. 
The 20-year limitation of i.C. § 5R203 applies to non-rigeqed claims for adverse possession 
Idaho law is consistent with the rule enWlciated in Cannon and similar federal cases. The 
Schoorls had not attained a vested right in the Lankford property at the time the statute was 
amended. An amendment altering the Idaho statute of limitation applies to causes of action that 
have not matured into vested rights at the time of amendment. 
For example, in In Stoner v. Carr. 97 Idaho 641 ,  550 P.2d 259 (1976), it was held that 
limitation period prescribed by a new statute is applicable from the effective date of its 
enactment. In that case, a doctor who performed surgery left a needle in the patient's body, 
which was later discovered and removed. The patient brought suit 1 7  months after discovery of 
the needle. At time of the original surgery, the statute of limitation for medical malpractice was 
two years from the date of the wrong or from notice, actUal or implied, of the presence of a 
foreign object in the patient's body. However, in 1 97 1 ,  after the date of the original surgery but 
' Again, this is consonant with Idaho law. See Capstar Radio Operating Co. v. Lawrence, 1 53 
Idaho 4 1 1 ,  420, 283 P.3d 728, 737 (201 2) n. 2: "the twenty year time period does not apply to an 
easement by prescription acquired prior to the amendment. u (emphasis added). 
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before discovery of the needle, the statute was amended to provide that the statute of limitation 
was two years from the date of the wrong or one year from the date of discovery of the foreign 
body. Thus, the statute was shortened insofar as it applied to the discovery of a foreign body. 
The issue in Stoner, as framed by the Idaho Supreme Court, was the time of accrual of 
the patient's cause of action. If the cause of action accrued qfter the effective date of the 
amendment, then the patient's cause of action would be barred by the one-year limitation period. 
On the other hand, if the cause of action accrued before the amendment of the statute of 
limitation, the patient' s complaint would be timely due to the application of the two-year 
limitation. The Court in Stoner held that, "The statute of limitation in effect when the right of 
action is deemed to accrue defines the statutory period unless the legislature provides otherwise.'' 
Id. at 643, 550 P.2d at 26 1 .  The cause of action was deemed to accrue, and the statute of 
limitation began to run, when the needle was discovered within the patient's body. At that point 
in time, the new one-year statute of limitation had been enacted and was in effect. Since the 
complaint was not filed until more than one year thereafter, the complaint was barred. 
A similar result is mandated in the present case. The Schoorls' cause of action could not 
accrue until they occupied the disputed strip of land for the full statutory period. Prior to that 
time, they possessed no cause of action and could bring a complaint Since they had not 
occupied the disputed land for the statutory period before July 1 ,  2006, their cause of action 
accrued only after the effective date of the statutory amendment. As in Stoner, "The statute of 
limitation in effect when the right of action is deemed to accrue defines the statutory period 
unless the legislature provides otherwise_,, In other words, the 20-year limitation period that took 
effect on July 1 ,  2006, is the applicable period. 
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The plaintiff in Stoner argued that applying the amended statute constituted a retroactive 
application. However, the Idaho Supreme Court explained that it had held otherwise: 
"A law is not retroactive merely because part of the factual situation to which it is 
applied occurred prior to its enactment; rather, a law is retroactive only when it 
operates upon transactions which have been completed or upon rights which have 
been acquired or upon obligations which have existed prior to its passage. 
(Citation omitted.) In cases such as the present, the right to compensation does 
not accrue and the rights of the parties do not become fixed until the occurrence 
of the event, in this case appellant's disability, which gives rise to a cause of 
action. (Citations omitted.)" Arnold v. Woolley, 95 Idaho 604; 606; 5 1 4  P .2d 599, 
60 1 (1 973), quoting Frisbie v. Sunshine Min. Co., 93 Idaho 1 69, 1 72, 457 P.2d 
408, 4 1 1 ( 1 969). 
-
Stoner v. Carr, 97 Idaho 641 ,  643, 550 P.2d 259, 261 (1 976). 
The same result obtains here. Application of the amended 20-year limitation period of § 
5-203 that became effective on July 1 ,  2006, does not constitute a retroactive amendment. 
The same result was reached in University of Utah Hospital v. Pence, 104 Idaho 1 72, 
1 75,657 P.3d 469, 472 (1 983), overruling Cook v. Massey, 36 Idaho 264, 220 P. 1 088 (1 923), 
and holding that "[t]he limitation prescribed by the new statute commenced when the cause of 
action was first subjected to the operation of the statute." See also Martin v. Clements, 98 Idaho 
906, 575 P.2d 885 ( 1 978) (holding that a cause of action was deemed to accrue at the time of the 
alleged negligent action and, thus, the limitation period in effect at that time applied): Esquivel v. 
State, 1 28 Idaho 390, 9 13  P.2d 1 1 60 (1996) (holding that a statutory amendment changing the 
limitation period for a petition for post-conviction relief was applicable as of the amendment's  
effective date); State v .  O 'Neill, 1 1 8 Idaho 244, 796 P.2d 1 2 1  (1 990) (holding that where that 
statute of limitation in effect at the time of the conunission of the acts with which the defendant 
was charged had not run, extension of the time by the legislature was not a retroactive 
amendment). In 0 'Neill, the Court pointed out the following: 
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As a general proposition, it may be stated that there is no such thing as a conunon 
law statute of limitation in criminal cases. Such statutes of limitation are matters 
of legislative grace; they are a surrendering by the sovereign of its right to 
prosecute. Since they are measures of public policy only. and subject to the will 
of the Legislature as such, they may be changed or repealed in any case where the 
right to a dismissal has not been absolutely acquired by the completion of the 
running of the statutory period of limitation. 
State v, O'Neill, 1 1 8 Idaho 244, 247, 796 P.2d 1 2 1 ,  1 24 (1 990). 
P.009/01 0  
While O'Neill was a criminal case, the same principle i s  applicable here. Until such time 
as the plaintiffs have acquired a vested right by the complete running of the statute of limitation, 
the legislature can change the limitation period at its pleasure. It did so by extending the period 
for adverse possession from 5 to 20 years. Since the Schoorls possessed no vested right as of the 
effective date of the amendment, the new statutory period of 20 years applies to their cause of 
action. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing authorities, the Schoorls' complaint fails to state a cause of action 
and should be dismissed. 
DATED this Z .. \) day ofNovember, 20 1 5. 
ELAM & BURKE, P.A. 
By: 
Jo N. Pirtle, Of the finn 
A!. omeys for Defendant Guild Mortgage 
Company 
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Plaintiffs Donald and Sonia Schoorl ("the Schoorls") initiated this quiet title action, alleging 
they purchased and then possessed a piece of real property in Canyon County, "to the exclusion of 
any and all other parties who may claim an interest" in the property. Defendants Guild Mortgage 
Company ("Guild") and Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. ("MERS") have now 
moved to dismiss the action for failure to state a claim, contending the Schoorls have failed to 
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establish possession, for purposes of an adverse possession claim, for the requisite statutory period. 1 
A hearing was held on the motions to dismiss, and related motions to set aside default 
judgments previously entered against MERS and Defendant Terry Lankford ("Lankford"),2 on 
November 24, 201 5. Rebecca Rainey appeared on behalf of the Schoorls, and Loren Ipsen and 
Joseph Pirtle appeared on behalf of both Guild and MERS. 
BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS 
The facts relevant to the motions currently before the Court are undisputed. The Schoorls 
purchased the subject property from a non-party in a written agreement on November 1 1 , 2001 .  
Shortly after executing that transaction, the Schoorls fenced the property, satisfied relevant tax 
obligations, and remained in "actual, peaceful possession" of the property until they field the present 
quiet title action on September 22, 2015 .  
On October 22, the Schoorls applied for entry of default against Lankford, MERS, and 
FATCo, representing to the Court that the necessary service of summons and complaint had been 
made on each and the allotted time for response had run. The Court granted the application and 
entered judgment against each on October 27. On the same day, Guild filed its motion to dismiss 
the Schoorls' action and memorandum in support, contending the Schoorls had failed to possess the 
property for the requisite statutory period. MERS joined Guild' s  motion that day. 
MERS filed its own motion to dismiss and memorandum in support on October 30, along 
with a motion to aside its default, contending ( 1 )  both the Schoorls' summons and application for 
1 The parties have at this point focused entirely on whether the Schoorls' possession of 
the property has given rise to a claim of ownership by adverse possession. The Court notes the 
Schoorls' complaint also alleges they purchased the subject property from a non-party, which 
might serve as an alternate basis for the Schoorls' quiet title action, but no party has addressed 
the allegation since. The Court will address only the adverse possession question (and a 
threshold question concerning previously entered default judgments) here. 
2 A default judgment had also been previously entered against Defendant First American 
Title ("FATCo"), but after stipulation of the parties, that judgment was vacated and FATCo has 
disclaimed any interest in the subject property. 
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entry of default had been defective, and (2) MERS, like Guild, had a meritorious defense. Guild, 
as a secured creditor of Lankford, added a motion to set aside Lankford' s  default on November 3,  
asserting service on Lankford had been defective, that the summons itself had been defective, and 
that Lankford shared Guild' s  meritorious defense. 
On November 7, the parties stipulated to an order setting aside FATCo's default, and 
FATCo filed a disclaimer of any interest in the property. 
The Court heard argument on the motions to set aside the Lankford and MERS defaults, 
along with the motions to dismiss the Schoorls ' action, on November 24. Guild, MERS, and 
Lankford (collectively, "the defendants") contend both default judgments should be set aside 
because both summonses were defective, failing to include the "mailing address, physical address or 
telephone number of the district court clerk" as required by I.R.C.P. 4. Service on Lankford was 
defective, the defendants add, because it was made on his ex-wife at a guest house distinct from his 
"dwelling house or usual place of abode," and in any event, Lankford remains an incompetent 
person not subject to default unless represented by a guardian or other appropriately appearing 
party. 
With respect to the merits of the Schoorls' adverse possession claim, the defendants note the 
current Idaho statute of limitations for ejectment actions is twenty years, and the Schoorls have only 
possessed the subject property for fourteen years. The Schoorls point out the statute was amended 
in 2006, revising the limitations period from five years to the current twenty years, and at that point 
they had possessed the property for approximately four years and eight months. The Court, the 
Schoorls argue, should find their claim for adverse possession had already "accrued" by the time the 
statute was amended, and should thus conclude any application of the new twenty-year limitations 
period to their claim would be impermissibly retroactive. The defendants respond by arguing the 
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Schoorls' claim would have accrued only after the effective date of the statutory change, and 
because "the statute of limitation in effect when the right of action is deemed to accrue defines the 
statutory period unless the legislature provides otherwise," the twenty-year period applies and the 
Schoorls cannot prevail. 
ANALYSIS 
I. Relief From Default is Appropriate Here Under Both I.R.C.P. 55 and I.R.C.P. 60. 
An entry of default or default judgment may be set aside under I.R.C.P. 55( c) for "good 
cause shown," or for any of the grounds found in I.R.C.P. 60(b). Bach v. Miller, 148 Idaho 549, 
552, 224 P.3d 1 138, 1 141  (2010). In determining whether a party has established good cause, a 
court may consider various factors, including "whether the default was willful," "whether setting 
aside the default would prejudice the opponent," and whether the party has shown a "meritorious 
defense." Dorion v. Keane, 1 53 Idaho 37 1 ,  374, 283 P.3d 1 18, 121  (Ct. App. 2012). The party may 
satisfy the "meritorious defense requirement by pleading facts which, if established, would 
constitute a defense to the action." Meyers v. Hansen, 148 Idaho 283, 287, 221 P.3d 8 1 ,  85 (2009). 
A court may also set aside a default under I.R.C.P. 60(b) in various circumstances, including 
scenarios where the 'judgment is void." I.R.C.P. 60(b)(4). A judgment may be void where the 
court lacks jurisdiction or authority to enter the judgment, or relatedly, where court "action amounts 
to a plain usurpation of power constituting a violation of due process." McGloon v. Gwynn, 140 
Idaho 727, 729, 100 P.3d 621 ,  623 (2004). By way of example most relevant to the circumstances 
here, a judgment entered where service has failed to meet constitutional "due process requirements 
of notice" is void for "lack of jurisdiction" and may appropriately be set aside under I.R.C.P. 60(b ).  
McGloon, 140 Idaho at 73 1 ;  see also Discover Bank v. Parrish, 201 1  WL 1 1038954, at * 1 (Idaho 
Ct. App. Apr. 15 ,  201 1 ) ("Generally, where a party has not been served with process or was 
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improperly served with process, any judgment against such party is void."). Ultimately, the court 
must remember 'judgments by default" are disfavored, and "relief should be granted in doubtful 
cases in order to decide [cases] on the merits." Suitts v. Nix, 141  Idaho 706, 708, 1 17 P.3d 1 20, 1 22 
(2005). 
Here, the defendants note the summonses actually served failed to comply with I.R.C.P. 
4(b ), which requires that a summons "contain . . .  the mailing address, physical address (if different) 
and phone number of the district court clerk." The summonses served here failed to contain any of 
that information, and those defects alone might constitute failure to "meet the due process 
requirement of notice." See, e.g. ,  Herrera v. Estay, 146 Idaho 674, 683, 201 P.3d 647, 656 (2009). 
The service on Lankford's ex-wife at a residence separate from Lankford's own raises even more 
serious concerns that he "was neither apprised of the pendency of the action nor afforded an 
opportunity to present his objections." !d. 
More importantly, the defendants appear to have established good cause under I.R.C.P. 55, 
and the Schoorls have presented no argument, by brief or otherwise, to the contrary. No evidence 
has been presented to suggest the defendants here willfully avoided or neglected the lawsuit, and no 
evidence suggests the Schoorls have been prejudiced by the delay of a few days. As our appellate 
courts have explained, "to be prejudicial, the setting aside of a judgment must result in greater harm 
than simply delaying the resolution of the case." Dorion v. Keane, 153 Idaho 37 1 ,  376, 283 P.3d 
1 18, 123 (Ct. App. 201 2). And if, as the defendants argue, the Schoorls have not yet possessed the 
subject property for the applicable statutory period, the defendants have a meritorious defense. 
Given these circumstances, and given Idaho' s  longstanding preference for resolving cases 
on the merits where possible, the Court concludes relief here is warranted under both I.R.C.P. 55  
and I.R.C.P. 60, and the Court will grant the motions to set aside both the MERS and Lankford 
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default orders and judgments. 
II. The Limitations Period Applicable to the Schoorls' Claim Is Twenty Years. 
Idaho Code section 5-203 directs that "[n]o action for the recovery of real property, or for 
the recovery of the possession thereof, can be maintained, unless it appears that the plaintiff . . .  was 
seized or possessed of the property in question with twenty (20) years before the commencement of 
the action . . . .  " As noted by the parties, the Idaho legislature amended this section in 2006; the 
relevant limitations period prior to 2006 was just five years. 
The Schoorls, as noted, ask for application of the shorter five-year period. They began 
possessing the subject property here in 2001 and at that point the statute still prescribed the five-year 
period. Idaho Code section 73- 101 , they point out, prohibits retroactive application of statutory 
changes, unless the statute itself expressly "declares" otherwise, and Idaho Code section 5-203 
makes no such declaration. Application of the amended version, they contend, would be 
impermissibly retroactive, because it would "create, enlarge, diminish or destroy" their "vested" 
right to claim ownership of the subject property by adverse possession. 
The defendants, however, respond by arguing the Schoorls had not yet possessed the subject 
property for five years when the statute was amended in 2006, and thus no right to claim ownership 
had vested. Any claim of ownership by adverse possession, the defendants maintain, would not 
have accrued until after the amendment, and a statute may only be said to be "retroactive only when 
it operates upon transactions which have been completed or upon rights which have been acquired . 
. . prior to its passage." Frisbie v. Sunshine Mining Co., 93 Idaho 1 69, 172, 457 P.2d 408, 4 1 1  
( 1969). The amended version is appropriately applied here, the defendants contend, and because the 
Schoorls have not possessed the subject property for twenty years, the adverse possession claim 
must be dismissed. 
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The plain language of section 5-203 guides the Court's analysis here. The section bars 
"action[ s] for the recovery of real property" where the claimant has not been "seized or possessed of 
the property" in the twenty years prior to commencement. In other words, the Court notes, the 
statute sets forth a limitations period after which original owners may no longer seek to eject 
adverse possessors-and it is only at that point, by implication, that a claim to title by adverse 
possession "matures." See Smith v. Long, 76 Idaho 265, 276, 28 1 P.2d 483, 49 1 ( 1955). Given that 
reading, a determination of the times at which the relevant rights here accrued is straightforward. 
A cause of action for ejectment generally accrues to the title holder or owner under section 
5-203 "at the moment" the adverse use is made or becomes discoverable, and that cause of action is 
then barred once the statutory period has run. See, e.g., Restatement (First) of Property § 460 cmt. a 
( 1944) (explaining ejectment "statutes prescribe a fixed period of time after which no entry may be 
made nor action brought to recover the possession of land");  id. § 465 cmt. a (explaining "a cause of 
action arises against" the adverse possessor "at the moment the use is made"). By symmetry and 
contrast, no cause of action for ownership may accrue to the adverse possessor until the statutory 
period has run. See id. § 460 cmt. a ("From this period of time is derived a minimum limit of time 
within which title to land may be acquired by adverse possession."); accord Long, 76 Idaho at 276-
77. 
Given this understanding of the relevant rights, that the original owner or title holder 
maintained a right to enter and eject the Schoorls from the subject property when the statute was 
amended in 2006 is clear. The Schoorls' right to title by adverse possession, by contrast, had not 
yet matured. See Long, 76 Idaho at 276-77. If, instead, the original owner's claims "had already 
been barred by the former statute"-i.e., the five-year version-application of the twenty-year 
period to those claims "would create or enlarge" rights that had already been extinguished. See, 
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e.g., Gailey v. Jerome Cty., 1 13 Idaho 430, 433, 745 P.2d 105 1 ,  1054 ( 1987). That application 
would, in other words, "create a cause of action" for the original owner "where none previously 
existed." State ex rei. Wasden v. Daicel Chem. Indus., Ltd., 141  Idaho 102, 106, 106 P.3d 428, 432 
(2005) .  
But here, the original owner' s rights of entry and ejectment had not yet been extinguished in 
2006, and thus no right of ownership by adverse possession had accrued to the Schoorls. Instead, 
the parties were in an altogether common situation-so common, in fact, that the Idaho Code sets 
forth specific instructions for dealing with it. Section 73- 107 provides that "[ w ]hen a limitation or 
period of time" for "barring a remedy" "prescribed in any existing statute" "has begun to run before 
these compiled laws go into effect, and the same or any limitation is prescribed in these compiled 
laws, the time which has already run shall be deemed part of the time herein prescribed as such 
limitation." In other words, as applied to the facts here, section 73- 107 directs that where a 
limitations period barring claims for ejectment has begun to run but has not yet been exhausted, and 
a new limitations period is adopted, the time already run will count for purposes of, but will not 
otherwise change, the duration of the new statutory bar. 
This understanding is, of course, entirely consistent with our existing case law, and 
consistent with the case law cited by the Schoorls. Had the Schoorls acquired an ownership right by 
adverse possession "prior to the amendment," the twenty-year bar would have no application. 
Capstar Radio Operating Co. v. Lawrence, 1 53 Idaho 4 1 1 ,  420, 283 P.3d 728, 737 n.2 (2012). 
Alternatively, had the Schoorls, as original owners, been exercising a right of ejectment which had 
first accrued "when [they were] illegally deprived of possession," perhaps application of a later­
amended limitations period would have acted to "create, enlarge, diminish or destroy" a vested 
right. See Lyles v. Roach, 30 S.C. 291 ,  9 S.E. 334, 335 (S.C. 1 889). But the Schoorls had not yet 
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.. 
acquired a right to ownership by adverse possession, see Long, 76 Idaho at 276, and they have not 
yet contended they seek ejectment here as original owners. Instead, the statutory bar had not yet run 
on the original owners in 2006. In that scenario, our appellate courts have explained, the legislature 
might well amend an applicable statute of limitations without offending our prohibition on 
retroactivity-any application at that point is properly deemed "prospective." See, e.g., State v. 
O 'Neill, 1 18 Idaho 244, 248, 796 P.2d 121 ,  125 (1990). 
Given the statutory language, the relevant legal principles on accrual, and the case law on 
retroactivity, the Court cannot conclude the five-year bar of the prior version of section 5-203 is 
applicable to the Schoorls' claim of ownership by adverse possession here. Instead, the Court 
concludes the present twenty-year bar is applicable to any claims of the original owners here, 
because those claims had not yet been extinguished when section 5-203 was amended in 2006. 
Because the parties agree the Schoorls have not yet possessed the subject property here for the 
requisite twenty years, the Court concludes the Schoorls' claim of ownership by adverse possession 
must be dismissed. 
CONCLUSION AND ORDER 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS the defendants' motions to dismiss. 
Dated this J.... day of£��-
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JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS: Plaintiffs cause of action for adverse 
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Telephone: (208) 343-5454 
Facsimile: (208) 3 84w5844 
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Attorneys for Defendants Guild Mortgage Company 
and Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc, 
DEC 1 6 2015 CANYON COUNTY CLERK il&«?�TY 
IN THE DIS1RICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN' AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
DONALD EDWARD SCHOORL and 
SONIA LINN SCHOORL as Trustees of the 
DONALD AND SONIA SCHOORL TRUST 
u/Va/ March 2, 20 15, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
TERRY 0. LANKFORD, an individual; 
GUILD MORTGAGE COMPANY, a 
California corporation; MORTGAGE 
ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION 
SYSTEMS, INC., a Delaware corporation; 
FIRST AMERICAN TITLE COMPANY, 
INC., a Florida corporation 
Defendant. 
Case No. CV-15-8639-C 
MEMORANDUM OF COSTS OF 
GUILD MORTGAGE COMPANY 
AND MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC 
REGISTRATION SYSTEMS, lNC. 
Defendants Guild Mortgage Company ("Guild'') and Mortgage Electronic Registration 
Systems, Inc. ("MERS"), by and through their counsel ofrecord, Etam '& Burke, P.A .• hereby 
submit the following Memorandum of Costs pursuant to Rule 54( d)( 1 )  of the Idaho Rules of 
Civil Procedure. Guild and MERS are the prevailing parties in this action and are entitled to 
MEMORANDUM OF COSTS OF GUILD MORTGAGE COMPANY AND MORTGAGE 
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recover their costs from plaintiffs Donald Edward Schoorl and Sonia Linn Schoorl, as trustees of 
the Donald and Sonia Schoorl Trust u/t/a March 2� 2015. 
COSTS AS A MA'ITER OF RIGHT PURSUANT TO I.R.C.P. 54({1)(1)(C) 
Item No. Descriotion of Cost Amount 
1 .  Filing fee paid to Canyon County District Court for filing $ 1 3 6.66 
Answer of Guild Mortgage Company 
2. Filing fee paid to Canyon County District Court for filing $ 1 36.00 
Answer of Mort�a�e Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. 
TOTAL COSTS AS A MA TIER OF RIGHT $272.00 
DATED this ,,�day ofDecember, 2015. 
ELAM & BURKE, P.A. 
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STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
County of Ada ) 
LOREN C. IPSEN, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says: 
That he is the attorney for defendants Guild Mortgage Company and Mortgage Electronic 
Registration Systems, Inc., in this action and, as such, has knowledge of facts relative to the 
above costs; that the items in the above memorandum are correct and have been necessarily 
incurred in said cause; and that the same are allowable under Rule 54(d)(l) of the Idaho Rules of 
Civil Procedure. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN T efore me this./�1/aay of December, 2015.  
.ffOtal'YPUblic for aho • 
Residing at,_-..p.�,....�-�-1--:::--hr-:-r.::.-­
My Commission Expires: ...C..Jtte.f"-f.IO'+.!C...l�s---
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correct copy of the foregoing document to be served as follows: 
Rebecca A. Rainey 
Fisher Rainey Hudson 
950 West Bannock Street, Suite 630 
Boise, ID 83 702 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
Phil E. DeAngeli 
DeAngeli Law, PLLC 
P.O. Box 6846 
Boise, ID 83707 
Attorney for First American Title 
Company, Inc. 
48S0-424.3-S628, v. I 
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__ Hand Delivery 
� Federal Express 
_2"Via Facsimile - 5 1 4w 1 900 
u.s. Mail 
__ Hand Delivery 
� Federal Express 
�Via Facsimile - 424-3 1 00 
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Rebecca A. Rainey, ISB #7525 
FISHER RAINEY HUDSON 
950 W. Bannock Street, Suite 630 
Boise, lD 83 702 
rar@frhtriallawyers.com 
Phone (208) 345-7000 
Fax (208) 5 14- 1 900 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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DEC 1 8 2015 CANYON COUNTY CLERK ��M'\.S�EPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THI RD JUDICIAL D ISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF rDAHO. IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
DONALD EDWARD SCHOORL and SONIA 
LINN SCHOORL as Trustees of the Case No: 1 5-8639-C 
DONALD AND SONIA SCHOORL TRUST 
u/t/aJ March 2, 201 5 ,  MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
TERRY 0. LANKFORD, an individual; 
GUILD MORTGAGE COMPANY, a 
California corporation; MORTGAGE 
ELECTRON IC REGISTRATION SYSTEMS. 
INC., a Delaware corporation� FIRST 
AMERICAN TITLE COMPANY, INC., a 
Florida Corporation, 
Defendants. 
COMES NOW Plaintitl: by and through undersigned counsel of record, and hereby 
requests pursuant to Rule l l (a)(2) that this Court reconsider its Memorandum Decision filed 
December 4, 201 5 .  A memorandum in support of motion for reconsideration is filed herewith. 
No oral argument is requested. 
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DATED this 1 8th day o f  December 20 1 5 . 
• Page : 1 0  
FISHER RAINEY HUDSON 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 1 8th day of December, 201 5, I caused to be served a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION upon the 
following individuals in the manner indicated below: 
Terry 0. Lankford 
6757 Bennett Road 




Elam & Burke, P.A. 
25 1 E. Front St., Ste. 300 
P.O. Box 1 539 
Boise, ID 8370 1 - 1 539 
Attorneys for Defendants Guild Morlgage 
Company and Alortgage Electronic Registration 
Systems, Inc. 
Phillip Deangeli  
355 W. Myrtle Street, Ste . .  I 01  
P.O. Box 6846 
Boise, ID 83707-6846 
Altorneys fiJr First American Tille Company, Inc. 
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Rebecca A. Rainey, ISB #7525 
FiSHER RAINEY HUDSON 
950 W. Bannock Street, Suite 630 
Boise, ID 83702 
rar@frhtrialla\\-yers.com 
Phone (208) 345-7000 
Fax (208) 5 1 4- 1 900 
Attorney/or Plaint{[( 
_F __ , A1pM 
DEC 1 8 2015 
C�r)l>fpN C9l.JNTY CLERK t(_(�r4A�TY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
DONALD EDWARD SCHOORL and SONIA 
LINN SCHOORL as Trustees of the 
DONALD AND SONIA SCHOORL TRUST 
u/t/a/ March 2, 20 1 5, 
Plaintiff� 
vs. 
TERRY 0. LANKFORD, an individual; 
GUILD MORTGAGE COMPANY. a 
California corporation; MORTGAGE 
ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION SYSTEMS, 
INC.,  a Delaware corporation; FIRST 
AMERICAN TITLE COMPANY, INC., a 
Florida Corporation, 
Defendants. 
Case No: 1 5-8639-C 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION TO RECONSIDER 
COME NOW Donald Edward Schoorl and Sonia Linn Schoorl, trustees of the Donald 
and Sonia Schoorl Trust ult/a/ March 2, 201 5  ("Schoorl") and hereby file the fol lowing 
memorandum in support of its motion for reconsideration of this Court's memorandum and 
decision, and subsequent final judgment, signed on December 2, 20 1 5, and entered on December 
4, 20 1 5 .  
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ARGUMENT 
In its memorandum and decision, this Court held that "A cause of action for ejectment 
generally accrues to the title holder or O\\-ner under section 5-203 'at the moment' the adverse 
use is made or becomes discoverable, and that cause of action is then barred once the statutory 
period has run." Memorandum Decision at 7. This Coun then held that, because the statutory 
period had not run completely at the time Idaho Code Section 5-203 1 was amended that the 
benetit of the lengthening of such limitations period inured to defendants' predecessor in interest 
and the adverse possession period applicable to the transaction at issue was extended from five 
years to twenty. 
Thereafter, this Court went on to explain that even though a claim tor ejectment accrues 
at the time the adverse possession period, unless and until that statutory period runs completely, 
any amendment to the statute of limitations may be retroactively applied. 
This Court' s  recognition and acknowledgement that a cause of action "accrues'' as of the 
first date of the adverse possession period, and subsequent holding that the amended limitations 
period applied retroactively is inconsistent with Idaho case law that expressly holds (i) that the 
statutory period to be applied is the one in place when the cause of action accrues and (ii) that 
statutes which impact substantive rights cannot be applied retroactively. Out of an over-
abundance of caution and to ensure that these issues have been adequately presented to this 
Court tor consideration and are, therefore, preserved for appeal (Parkwest Homes, LLC v. 
Barnson, 238 P.3d 203, 208 (201 0)), plaintiffs ask this Court to reconsider its memorandum 
decision 
1 The adverse possession statute complementing the ejectment statute are 5-207 and 5-2 1 0; because each contains 
the same limitations periods, it is plaintiffs position that the rationale set forth herein is applicable to al l .  
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A. Idaho law expressly provides that the statute of limitations that governs a claim is 
the limitations period in place when the cause of action accrues. 
Under Idaho law, the limitations period that governs a claim is the l imitations period in 
place at the time a cause of action accrues. See, generally, Stoner v. Carr. 97 Idaho 64 1 ( 1 976); 
also cited in Reply to Plaint{ffs ' Memorandum in Opposition to motions to Set Aside Default and 
to Dismiss at 6. This Court acknowledged that a cause of action for ejectment accrues on the 
tirst day someone adversely possesses the property. Memorandum Decision at 7. Accordingly, 
the l imitations period that was in place when the Schoorls' predecessor in interest begin 
adversely possessing the property was the tive year limitations period and such period should be 
applied to the claims. 
In its memorandum decision, this Court avoided that straightforward application of Idaho 
Jaw and instead looked to whether the right accrued had been completely extinguished by the 
running of the limitations period and held that-so long as the right had not been completely 
extinguished-then the l imitations period could be moditied. This rationale directly contradicts 
the authority of Stoner v. Carr which provides that the controlling l imitations period is the one in 
place when the cause of action accrues. Accordingly, in order to determine that a different 
limitations period applies (and should, therefore, be applied retroactively) this Court had to then 
determine that parties had no substantive rights under Idaho's adverse possession statutes unless 
and unti l  the ful l  prescriptive period had run. 
B. The adverse possession statutes go,•ern parties' substantive rights and cannot, 
therefore, be given a retroactive effect. 
The Schoorls respectfully request that this Court reconsider its conclusion that a party 
undertaking the atlirmative actions necessary to establish a claim for adverse possession has not 
engaged in any substantive actions that can be negatively impacted by retroactive application of 
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the limitations period. As noted by this Court and agreed by the parties, Idaho law is well settled 
that a law is said to impact substantive rights, and therefore be considered retroactive "only when 
it operates upon transactions which have been completed or upon rights which have been 
acquired or upon obligations which have existed prior to its passage." Stoner v. Carr, 97 Idaho 
64 1 ,  643 ( 1 976) (emphasis added); see also Rep(y to Plaintiffs · Memorandum in Opposilion to 
Afotions to Set Aside Default and to Dismiss at 7 and Memorandum Decision at 6 (quoting 
Frisbie v. Sunshine Mining Co .. 93 Idaho 1 69. 1 72, 457 P.2d 408, 4 1 1 ( 1 969)). 
In reaching its decision, this Court incorrectly focused on the adverse possession period 
as the transaction that must be completed in order for the rights impacted by the statute to be 
considered substantive. Rather, the transaction upon which this Court could and should have 
focused was the sale of the property by defendants' predecessor in interest and the purchase o f  
the property b y  the Schoorls' predecessor in interest: that transaction was completed in  200 l and 
it was that transaction that gave rise to the parties' subsequent conduct� to wit, the Schoorls' 
predecessor' s-in-interest open and notorious possession of the land that they had just purchased .  
And, indeed, had defendants' predecessor in interest had some objection t o  the Schoorls fencing 
that tract of Jand2, it was that action that would have triggered the defendants' predecessor in 
interest's  right to file an action for ejectment. 
This analysis of what contemplates a '"transaction" is guided by the Supreme Court's 
decision in Meyers v. Vermaas, 1 14 Idaho 85,  87, 753 P.2d 296, 298 ( 1 988).  In that case, an 
an1endment to the statute providing tor mandatory attorney's fees went into effect after the 
lawsuit commenced but prior to the conclusion of the litigation. In that case, the tiling of a 
lawsuit was considered a sufficient undertaking to substantively impact the rights of the 
i In all fairness, the fencing of a tract of land can and should be considered a ''completed transaction'' rhat 
substantively impacts the rights of the parties. 
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respective parties. Accordingly, the Supreme Court found that any change to the avai lable 
remedies necessarily impacted the substantive rights of the parties governing a transaction that 
had already been initiated. The rationale underlying such decision i s  that the parties-having 
known that mandatory attorney's fees were an issue-might have reached a different decision 
regarding whether it made sense to file a lawsuit. 
Moreover, as the law affords a presumption that the parties to the land sale transaction 
were aware of the state of the law at the time the transaction was completed (i .e., a five year 
l imitations period for adverse possession), then it is equally appropriate to assume that such 
information impacted the behavior of the parties to the transaction. lndeed, it goes without 
saying that the buyer would be substantially more concerned with properly documenting the 
transaction if the adverse possession period was 20 years than if it was five years. This rational 
is consistent with that guiding the decision in lvfeyers v. Vermaas, where our Supreme Court held 
that parties contemplating the filing of a lawsuit would undertake a different analysis if they 
knew such action carried the risk of mandatory attorney's fees paid by the losing party. 
Just as the initiation of a lawsuit is a "transaction" that governs the substantive rights of 
the parties, so too are the acts necessary to initiate adverse possession: purchasing, fencing, and 
cultivating the property, as happened in this case. Accordingly, that is the transaction upon 
which this Court should focus in reaching the determination that any subsequent change to the 
applicable limitations period wil l ,  necessarily, impact substantive rights of the parties regarding 
transactions already undertaken. 
CONCLUSION 
For the forgoing reasons, the Schoorls respectfully request that this Court reconsider its 
memorandum decision and hold as fol lows: 
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l .  A cause of action tor ejectment (and, conversely for adverse possession) accrues as of the 
first day of the adverse possession period (Memorandum Decision at 7); 
2. The limitations period in place at the time a cause of action accrues is the governing 
limitations period (Stoner v. Carr, 97 Idaho 64 1 ( 1 976); 
3 .  The l imitations period in place at the commencement o f  the adverse possession period 
was a five-year statute (LC. §§ 5-203, -207, -2 1 0  ( 1 91 9); 
4. The actions necessary to undertake the adverse possession of a parcel of property 
constitute a transaction that impacts the substantive rights of a party which cannot, 
thereafter, be negatively impacted by the retroactive application of a statute governing 
adverse possession (Afeyers v. Vermaas, 1 1 4 Idaho 85, 87, 753 P.2d 296, 298 ( 1 988)). 
The Schoorls further respectfully request that, upon such reconsideration, the judgment 
dismissing their claims for quiet title be set aside so that this matter may proceed on the merits 
and in accordance with the appropriate l imitations period. 
DATED this l 81h day of December. 20 1 5 . 
FISHER RAINEY HUDSON 
.......____? --·-=:::::> 
By: jc:.-:--r" df � 
R�becca A. Rainey:<i[t tim1 
Attorneys for Plaintiti 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 1 8th day of December, 20 1 5, I caused to be served a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing MEMORANDUM I N  SUPPORT OF MOTION TO 
RECONSIDER upon the tollowing individuals in  the manner indicated below: 
Terry 0. Lankford 
6757 Bennett Road 




Elam & Burke, P.A. 
25 1 E. Front St., Ste. 300 
P.O. Box 1 539 
Boise, ID 83701 - 1 539 
Allorneys for Defendants Guild Mortgage 
Company and Mortgage Electronic Registration 
Systems, Inc. 
Phillip Deangeli 
355 W. Myrtle Street, Ste., 1 0 1  
P.O. Box 6846 
Boise, ID 83707-6846 
Allomeysfor First American Title Company, Inc. 
(i>(Via U.S. Mail 
( ) Via Facsimile 
( ) Via Overnight Mail 
( ) Via Hand Delivery 
( ) Via U.S. Mail 
�)':).Via Facsimile 
( ) Via Overnight Mail 
( ) Via Hand Delivery 
( ) Via U.S. Mail 
(;0_Via Facsimile 
( ) Via Overnight Mail 
( ) Via Hand Delivery 
Rebecca � - Raiz�eyc o! 
Attorneyfor Plamt(fj-
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO RECONSIDER - 7 
98
1 21231201 5 08:55 Elam & Burke - P.0021009 
' 
Loren C; Ipsen, ISB #1767 
Joseph N. Pirtle, ISB #6973 
ELAM & BURKE, P.A. 
25 1 East Front Street Suite 300 
Post Office Box 1539 
F I A.k I "dt;? q.M. \ 
Boise. Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 343-5454 
Facsimile: (208) 384-5844 
lci@elamburke.com 
jnp@elamburke.com 
Attorneys for Defendant Guild Mortgage Company 
DEC 2 3 2015 
CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
T. CRAWFORD, DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
DONALD EDWARD SCHOORL and 
SONIA LINN SCHOORL as Trustees ofthe 
DONALD AND SONIA SCHOORL TRUST 
u/t/a/ March 2, 2015, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
TERRY 0. LANKFORD, an individual; 
GUILD MORTGAGE COMPANY, a 
California corporation; MORTGAGE 
ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION 
SYSTEMS, INC., a Delaware corporation; 
FIRST AMERICAN TITLE COMPANY, 
INC., a Florida corporation 
Defendant. 
Case No. CV- 15-8639 .. C 
RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS' 
MOTION TO RECONSIDER 
Defendants Guild Mortgage Company ("Guild") and Mortgage Electronic Registration 
Systems, Inc. (''MERS''), by and through their atto�eys of record, Elam & Burke, P.A., file this 
response to Plaintiffs • Motion to Reconsider and supporting memorandum. 
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ANALYSIS 
P.0031009 
1. Tbe zo .. year limitation of I.C. § S.203 applies to non-ripened claims for adverse possess(sw.. 
The Court's Memorandum Decision entered on December 4, 2015, correctly identifies 
Plaintiffs" claim as a non-ripened claim for adverse possession. Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider 
argues that the five--year statute of limitations in place when Plaintiffs' predecessors in interest 
began adversely possessing the subject property should be applied to Plaintiffs' claim because 
taking the steps to establish an adverse possession claim, rather than completing the prescribed 
period for adverse possession. is a substantive action that can be negatively impacted by 
retroactive application of a statute of limitations. 
Plaintiffs' arguments appear to be based upon a beliefthat completion of the adverse 
possession period is not what triggers a right to adverse possession. Specifically, Plaintiffs argue 
the following: 
In reaching its decision, this Court incorrectly focused on the adverse possession 
period as the transaction that must be completed in order for the rights impacted 
by the statute to be considered substantive."' '1tather, the transaction upon which 
this Court could and should have focused was the sale of the property by 
defendants' predecessor in interest and the purchase of the property by the 
Schoorls' predecessor in interest: that transaction was completed in 2001 and it 
was that transaction that gave rise to the parties' subsequent conduct; to wit. the 
Schoorls' predecessor' s-in-interest open and notorious possession of the land that 
they had just purchased. 
(Memorandum in Support of Motion to Reconsider, p. 4.) Defendants Ouild and MERS 
respectfully disagree, primarily for the reasons raised in Defendants' prior briefing on file with 
this Court, which are incorporated herein by reference. Plaintiffs' cause of action could not 
accrue until they occupied the disputed strip of land for the full statutory period. Prior to that 
time, they possessed no cause of action and could not bring a complaint. Since they had not 
occupied the disputed land for the statutory period before July 1 ,  2006, their cause of action 
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accrued only after the effective date of the statutory amendment. As in Stoner v. Carr, 97 Idaho · 
. 641 ,  643, 550 P.2d 259, 26 1 (1976), "The statute of limitation in effect when the right of action 
is deemed to accrue defmes the statutory period unless the legislature provides otherwise.', 
(Emphasis added�. In other words, the 20-year limitation period that took effect on July 1 ,  2006, 
is the applicable period. 
Like Plaintiffs in this case, the plaintiff in Stoner argued that applying the amended 
statute constituted a retroactive application. However, the Idaho Supreme Court explained that it 
had held otherwise: 
"A law is not retroactive merely because part of the factual situation to which it is 
applied occurred prior to its enactment; rather, a law is retroactive only when it 
operates upon transactions which have been completed or upon rights which have 
been a.cgyired or upon obligations which have existed prior to its passage. 
(Citation omitted.) In cases such as the present. the right to compensation does 
not accrue and the rights of the parties do not become fixed until the occurrence 
of the event. in this case appellant's disability, which gives rise to a cause of 
action. (Citations omitted.) .. Arnold v. Woolley, 95 Idaho 604, 606, 5 14 P.2d 599. 
601 (1973), quoting Frisbie v. Sunshine Min. Co.� 93 Idaho 169, 1 72, 457 P.2d 
408, 41 1 (1969). 
Stoner, 97 Idaho at 643, 550 P.2d at 26 1 (emphasis added) . The same result applies here. 
Application of the amended 20-year limitation period ofldaho Code § 5-203 that became 
effective on July 1,  2006, does not constitute an impennissible retroactive amendment because 
Plaintiffs' adverse possession claim had not accrued by July 1 ,  2006. 
Plaintiffs' contention that .. a cause of action 'accrues ' as ofthe first date of the adverse 
possession period,,1 is illogical . The Plaintiffs' rights did not become fixed and they certainly 
possessed no cause of action upon which they could bring suit on the initial date of their period 
of adverse possession. Their right accrued and they could maintain an action only when they 
were .. seized or possessed of the property in question" for the prescriptive period prior to the 
1 Memorandum in Support of Motion to Reconsider, p. 2. 
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commencement of the action." I. C. § 5-203. In order to plead a cause of action for adverse 
possession it was incumbent upon the Plaintiffs to show that their use of the subject property was 
(1) open and notorious, (2) continuous and uninterrupted, {3) adverse and under claim of right, 
( 4) with the actual or imputed knowledge of the owner, (5) for the statutory period. Backman v. 
Lawrence, 147 Idaho 390, 210 P.3d 75 (2009). In the absence of any ofthese elements, they had 
no cause of action. if their possession of the property was sporadic or interrupted (for example, 
if they abandoned the property for a year) their claim :tailed to accrue. 
The Idaho courts have held repeatedly that the prohibition against retroactive application 
of new laws absent clear legislative intent2 applies to substantive, rllther than procedural or 
remedial, laws. ''Damages and punislunents are substantive law.'' Grover v. Isom, 137 Idaho 
770, 774, 53 P.3d 82 1 , 82S (2002). A substantive law is one that ncreates a cause of action to 
recover damages where none previously existed." State ex rel. Wasden v. Daicel Chemical 
Industries, Ltd., 141 Idaho 102, 106, 1 06 P.3d 428, 432 (200S). On the other hand, purely 
remedial legislation applies to the existing state of affairs. "A statute that is procedural or 
remedial and does not create, enlarge, diminish or destroy contractual or vested rights is 
generally held not to be a retroactive statute, even though it was enacted subsequent to the events 
to which it operates.'' Id. at 1 05, 106 P3d at 43 1 (quoting Bryan v. City of Blackfoot, 137 Idaho 
307, 3 1 3, 48 P.3d 636, 642 (2002)). ,.In this context, a statute is remedial if it does not create, 
enlarge, diminish or destroy any substantive rights, but merely alters the remedy available for 
enforcing pre-existing rights." Id "Therefore, remedial and procedural statutes should be 
applied retroactively., Tuttle v. Wayment Farms, Inc., 1 3 1  Idaho 105, 108, 952 P.2d 1241 ,  1 244 
(1 998). 
2 Idaho Code § 73.101.  
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As a general proposition, it may be stated that there is no such thing as a common 
law statute of limitation in criminal cases. Such statutes of limitation are matters 
of legislative grace; they are a surrendering by the sovereign of its right to 
prosecute . Since they are measures of public policy only, and subject to the will 
of the Legislature as such, they may be changed or repealed in any case where the 
right to a dismissal has not been absolutely acquired by the completion of the 
running of the statutory period of limitation. 
State v. O'Neill, 1 18 Idaho 244, 247, 796 P.2d 121,  1 24 (1990). 
No person has a vested right in freezing the statute of limitation applicable to a viable; 
i.e., non-barred, cause of action. As stated by the Idaho Supreme Court in Frisbie v. Sunshine 
Mining Co., 93 Idaho 1 69, 1 72, 457 P .2d 408, 41 1 ( 1969): 
A law is not retroactive merely because part of the factual situation to which it is 
applied occurred prior to its enactment; rather, a law is retroactive only when it 
operates upon transactions which have been completed or upon rights which have 
been acquired or upon obligations which have existed prior to its passage. 2 
Sutherland, Statutory Construction, s 2202, p. 1 17 (3d ed. 1943); 82 C.J.S. 
Statutes s 412, p. 980. In cases such as the present, the right to compensation does 
not accrue and the rights of the parties do not become fixed until the occurrence of the event, in this case appellant's disability, which gives rise to a cause of 
action. Peterson v. Federal Mining & Smelting Co., 67 Idaho 1 1 1, 170 P.2d 6 1 1  
( 1 946); Silver King Coalition Mines Co. \l. Industril:tl Commission. 2 Utah 2d 1 ,  
268 P.2d 689 (1954); Belanowitz v. Travelers Ins. Co . •  123 N.J.S. 574, 10 A.2d 
1 78 {1 940); King v. St. Louis Steel Casting Co., 353 Mo. 400, 182 S.W.2d 560 
(1 944). Consequently, application ofthe law in effect at the time the disability 
occurred to a claim arising from that disability does not involve a retroactive 
application of the law. 
P.007/009 
Similarly, in Hecla Mining Co. v. Idaho State Tax Commission, 108 Idaho 1 47, 150, 697 
P.2d 1 1 6 1 ,  1 164 (1985), it was held that the legislature may extend the statute of limitations With 
respect to a non-barred tax claim: 
"The shelter of a statute of limitations has never been regarded as a fundamental 
right. and the lapse of a statute oflimitations does not endow a citizen with a 
vested property right in immunity from suit. •• Starks v. S.E. Rykoff & Co., 673 
F.2d 1 1 06, 1 109 (9th Cir.1982). "Where a lapse of time has not invested a party 
with title to real or personal property, a state legislature may extend a lapsed 
statute of limitations without violating the fourteenth amendment, regardless of 
whether the effect is seen as creating or reviving a barred claim." Id These 
propositions are true because statutes of limitation involve matters of remedy, not 
destruction ofrights. 
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Until such time as the Plaintiffs acquired a vested right by the complete running of the 
statute of limitations, the legislature could change the limitation period at its pleasure. It did so 
by extending the period for adverse possession from 5 to 20 years. Since the Schoorls possessed 
no vested right as of the effective date of the amendment, the new statutory period of ZO years 
applies to their cause of action. 
Plaintiffs' reliance on Myers v. Vermaas, 1 14 Idaho 85, 7S3 P.2d 296 (1988). is similarly 
misplaced. Myers determined the statutory amendment to be more accurately classified as 
substantive than remedial or procedural and that it therefore should not be given retroactive 
effect. This was because of the mandatory nature of the award of attorney• s fees under the 
amended statute. which the Court described as an adjunct to the underlying commercial 
agreement between the parties. Myers, 1 14 1daho at 87. In this case. however, the amendment 
ofldaho Code § 5-203 did not impact a substantive right held by Plaintiffs or their predecessors 
in interest because at the time of the amendment neither Plaintiffs nor their predecessors had an 
accrued right to the subject property by adverse possession. Since the right had not accrued by 
1uly l,  2006, the amended statutory period of20 years applies. 
CONQ.,Y§ION 
Based on the foregoing, Defendants Guild and MERS respectfully request that the Court 
deny Plaintiffs� Motion to Reconsider. This Court's prior determination is correct and should 
not be set aside or reconsidered. 
DATED this 23� day of December, 2015.  
ELAM & BURKE, P.A. 
By: 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
DONALD EDWARD SCHOORL and SONIA 
LINN SCHOORL as Trustees of the Case No: CV 1 5-8639-C 
DONALD AND SONIA SCHOORL TRUST 
u/t/a/ March 2, 201 5, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
TERRY 0. LANKFORD, an individual; 
GUILD MORTGAGE COMPANY, a 
California corporation; MORTGAGE 
ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION SYSTEMS, 
INC., a Delaware corporation; FIRST 
AMERICAN TITLE COMPANY, INC., a 
Florida Corporation, 
Defendants. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
TO: THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENTS, Guild Mortgage Company, and Mortgage 
Electronic Registration Systems Inc.,  AND THE PARTIES' ATTORNEYS Loren Ipsen, ELAM 
& BURKE, P.A., 25 1 E. Front St. Ste. 300, PO Box 1539, Boise, ID 8370 1 ,  AND THE CLERK 
OF THE ABOVE ENTITLED COURT. 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1 .  The above named appellant Donald Edward Schoorl and Sonia Linn Schoorl as 
Trustees of the Donald and Sonia Schoorl Trust u/t/a March 2, 201 5, appeals against the above 
named respondents to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Memorandum Decision and the 
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Judgment entered in the above entitled action on the 4th day of December, 201 5, Honorable 
Judge George Southworth presiding. 
2. That the party has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the 
judgments or orders described in paragraph 1 above are appealable orders under and pursuant to 
Rule 1 1 (a)(l )  I.A.R. 
3. A preliminary statement of the issues on appeal which the appellant then intends 
to assert in the appeal; provided, any such list of issues on appeal shall not prevent the appellant 
from asserting other issues on appeal: 
a. The District Court erred in holding that the 20 year statute of limitations that went 
into effect on July 1 ,  2006, rather than the 5 year statute of limitations in effect in 
2001 ,  was the governing limitations period for a claim involving a party who 
began adversely possessing the property in 200 1 .  
4 .  No order has been entered sealing any portion of the record. 
5 .  No transcript is requested. 
6. The appellant request the following documents to be included in the clerk's record in 
addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, I.A.R. : 
a. 10/27/1 5  Defendant Guild Mortgage Company' s  Motion to Dismiss 
b. 10/27/1 5  Memorandum in Support of Defendant Guild Mortgage Company' s  
Motion to Dismiss 
c. 10/27/15  Notice of Joinder in Defendant Guild Mortgage Company's  Motion to 
Dismiss 
d. 10/30/15  Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems Inc's  Motion to Set Aside 
Default and Default Judgment 
e. 1 0/30/15  Memorandum in Support of Motion to Set Aside 
f. 1 1/03/1 5  Memorandum in Support of Defendant Guild Mortgage Company' s  
Motion to Set Aside Default and Default Judgment Against Defendant Terry 0. 
Lankford 
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g. 1 1103/1 5 Declaration of Shawna Ramos in Support of Guild Mortgage 
Company' s  Motion to Set Aside Default and Default Judgment Against 
Defendant Terry 0. Lankford 
h. 1 1 / 1711 5 Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Set Aside Default and to 
Dismiss 
1. 1 1/20/ 15  Reply to Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to Motions to Set Aside 
Default and to Dismiss 
J .  1 2/ 1 8/ 15  Motion for Reconsideration 
k. 12/ 18/1 5 Memorandum in Support of Motion to Reconsider 
1. 12/23/1 5 Response to Plaintiff s  Motion to Reconsider 
7. I certify: 
a. That a copy of this notice of appeal has been served on each reporter of whom a 
transcript has been requested - Not Applicable. 
b. That the clerk of the district court has been paid the estimated fee for the 
preparation of the reporter' s  transcript - Not Applicable. 
c. That the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's record has been paid. 
d. That the appellate filing fee has been paid. 
e. That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to Rule 
20. 
DATED this 1 3th day of January 2016 .  
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 3 
FISHER RAINEY HUDSON 
By:� a� 
Rebecca Rainey, of th� 
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PO Box 1 539 
Boise, ID 83701 
F:  (208) 384-5844 
Attorneys for Defendant Guild Mortgage Company 
and Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems 
Terry 0. Lankford 
6757 Bennett Road 
Nampa, ID 83686 
Defendant 
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CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
K BUTLER, DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
DAVID EDWARD SCHOORL and SONIA 
LINN SCHOORL, as Trustees of the 
DONALD AND SONIA SCHOORL TRUST, 
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TERRY 0. LANKFORD, an individual; 
GUILD MORTGAGE COMPANY, a 
California corporation; MORTGAGE 
ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION SYSTEMS, 
INC., a Delaware corporation; and FIRST 
AMERICAN TITLE COMPANY, INC., a 
Florida corporation, 
) 
) CASE NO. CV -2015-8639-C 
) 
) 
) ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S 













The court has reviewed Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration and Memorandum 
submitted herewith. For the reasons set forth in this Court's Memorandum Decision filed 
December 4, 201 5, Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED. 
Dated: February /..J__, 201 6. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
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